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This technical note is developed in part as a mathematical companion to the paper ‘The Real 
Exchange Rate in Sticky Price Models: Does Investment Matter?’ (GMPI working paper no. 
17).  Our  two-country model incorporates capital accumulation  with  adjustment costs, 
variable capital utilization and investment-specific technological shocks. Nominal rigidities 
and monopolistic competition distort the goods markets of each country and allow monetary 
policy to have real effects. We investigate two different international pricing scenarios, local-
currency pricing (where the law of one price fails) and producer-currency pricing (where the 
law of one price holds). This technical note contains three basic calculations. First, we derive 
the equilibrium conditions of the open economy model under local-currency pricing and 
producer-currency pricing. Second, we compute the zero-inflation,  zero-trade balance 
(deterministic) steady state. Third, we describe the log-linearization of the  equilibrium 
conditions around the deterministic steady state. Simultaneously, commentary is provided 
whenever necessary to  enhance  the model description and to place the assumptions 
embedded in our DSGE framework into context. 
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Here, we brie￿ y describe the structure of the benchmark monetary open economy model.
1.1 The Intertemporal Consumption and Savings Problem
We specify a stochastic, two-country general equilibrium model. Each country is populated by a continuum
of in￿nitely lived (and identical) households in the interval [0;1]. In each period, the domestic households￿

















where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective intertemporal discount factor. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
satis￿es that ￿ > 0 (￿ 6= 1) while the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply satis￿es that ’ > 0.
We assume that both countries have unrestricted access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded
internationally. The domestic household maximizes its lifetime utility in (1) subject to the sequence of
budget constraints described by,










+ WtLt + ZtKt + Prt; (2)
and the law of motion for capital,
Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + Vt￿(Xt;Xt￿1;Kt)Xt; (3)
where Wt is the domestic nominal wage, Pt is the domestic consumption price index (CPI), Prt are the
nominal pro￿ts generated by the domestic ￿rms, and Tt is a lump-sum nominal tax levied on the domestic
households.1 Moreover, Xt is domestic real investment, Kt stands for domestic real capital, Zt de￿nes the
nominal rental rate of capital, and Vt is an exogenous, investment-speci￿c technological (IST) shock. IST
shocks a⁄ect the e¢ ciency in producing investment goods.
We denote st+1 the event that occurs at time t+1 and st+1 = (st;st+1) the history of events up to that
point. The households￿portfolio includes a complete set of one-period contingent claims (Arrow-Debreu
securities), traded internationally and quoted in units of the domestic currency. Households have unrestricted
access to all contingent claims, Pb ￿
st j st￿1￿
is the domestic price at time t￿1 of the contingent claim that





St is the corresponding price in foreign currency units. St
denotes the nominal exchange rate, B (st) is the nominal pay-o⁄ received by the domestic households after
the event st occurs at time t on a contingent claim purchased at time t￿1 (which would have paid nothing if
event st had not happened). The foreign households maximize their lifetime utility subject to an analogous
sequence of budget constraints and the same law of motion for capital.
We assume that there is no trade in either domestic or foreign ￿rm shares imposing de facto a strict
home bias in stock portfolios. Sole ownership of the local ￿rms rests in the hands of the local households.
1We do not fully incorporate ￿scal policy in our model. However, we include lump-sum taxes in order to ￿nance a subsidy
for ￿rms that can neutralize the mark-up distortion associated with our assumption that companies operate under monopolistic
competition. In case no subsidy is introduced, then the lump-sum tax would be equal to zero, i.e. Tt = 0.
1However, this strong assumption on share-holdings does not undo our postulate of complete international
asset markets because households in both countries do have access to a full set of contingent claims with
which they can pool and share risks e¢ ciently. Therefore, households can replicate any stream of payo⁄s
that trade in ￿rm shares would a⁄ord them by using the available Arrow-Debreu securities only. Money is
purely a unit of account, although monetary policy has an impact by regulating short-term nominal interest
rates in the presence of nominal rigidities. Embedded in the speci￿cation of the budget constraint lies also
the assumption that both factor markets (for labor and capital) are homogenous and perfectly competitive
within a country, but segregated across countries. In other words, factors can be used for production purposes
in any ￿rm within the same country, but they are immobile across borders.
Capital accumulation may be subject to adjustment costs. We consider three special cases: the capital
adjustment cost (CAC) case, the investment adjustment cost (IAC) case, and the case with no adjustment
costs (NAC). The (NAC) function is simply,
￿(Xt;Xt￿1;Kt) = 1: (4)




= 1, ￿0 ￿
X;X;K
￿
= 0, and ￿00 ￿
X;X;K
￿
= 0. The CAC and
IAC adjustment cost functions, however, require a more detailed description.
Capital Adjustment Cost (CAC) Function. We adopt the same speci￿cation for the capital adjust-



















Kt is the corresponding investment-to-capital ratio and ￿ is the depreciation rate coming from the
law of motion for capital. Among the properties of this adjustment cost function that are relevant for our






































































We assume that in steady state the investment-speci￿c shock is at its unconditional mean, and V = 1.
Hence, in steady state the adjustment costs dissipate and the investment-to-capital ratio is equal to the
depreciation rate (i.e., X = ￿K) as in the standard neoclassical model. This implies that ￿(￿) = 1,
￿0 (￿) = 0, and ￿00 (￿) = ￿
￿
￿ . The same adjustment cost formula applies to the foreign households￿problem.
Investment Adjustment Cost (IAC) Function. We also explore the investment adjustment cost func-
tion (IAC) used among others by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, et al. (2005). We conjecture


























































































In steady state, the adjustment costs dissipate again and the net investment growth is zero. Hence, the law
of motion for capital is the same as in the standard neoclassical model in steady state. This also implies
that ￿(1) = 1, ￿0 (1) = 0, and ￿00 (1) = ￿￿. It is costly to change the level of investment and the cost is
increasing in the size of the change, but there are no adjustment costs in steady state. The same adjustment
cost formula applies to the foreign households￿problem.
Aggregation Rules and the Price Indexes. We assume that investment, like consumption, is a com-
posite index of domestic and imported foreign varieties. The home and foreign consumption bundles of the
domestic household, CH
t and CF
t , as well as the investment bundles, XH
t and XF
t , are aggregated by means




















































































The elasticity of substitution across varieties produced within a country is ￿ > 1, and the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution between the home and foreign bundles of varieties is ￿ > 0. The share of the
home goods in the domestic aggregators is ￿H, while the share of foreign goods is ￿F. We assume the shares
are homogeneous, i.e. ￿H +￿F = 1. Similarly, we can de￿ne the aggregators for the foreign household. The
only di⁄erence being that the share of the home goods in the foreign aggregators is ￿
￿
H = ￿F, while the
share of foreign goods in the foreign aggregator is ￿
￿
F = ￿H.
3The model introduces home-product bias in preferences (Warnock, 2003) as well as in the composition
of investment. By assumption, investment goods can only be used for local production after aggregation.
This is also the case because of compositional di⁄erences across countries. However, it must be noted that
all local and foreign varieties can be traded internationally for either consumption or investment purposes.
Moreover, the symmetry of the aggregators implies that the corresponding price indexes are identical for
the investment and consumption bundles. Hence, the price of consumption and investment is the same as
re￿ ected in the budget constraint (that is, in equation (2)).
Under standard results on functional separability, the CPI indexes which correspond to our speci￿cation









































































t are the price sub-indexes for the home- and foreign-produced bundle of goods in units of
the home currency. Similarly for PH￿
t and PF￿







where St denotes the nominal exchange rate.
1.2 The Firms￿Problem
Each ￿rm supplies the home and foreign market, and sets prices in the local currency (henceforth, local-
currency pricing or LCP). Firms engage in third-degree price discrimination across markets (re-selling is
infeasible) and, furthermore, enjoy monopolistic power in their own variety. Frictions in the goods market
are modelled with nominal price stickiness ￿ la Calvo (1983). At time t any ￿rm (whether domestic or
foreign) is forced to maintain its previous period prices in the domestic and foreign markets with probability
0 < ￿ < 1. Instead, with probability (1 ￿ ￿), the ￿rm receives a signal to optimally reset each price.
We assume that production employs a (homogeneous of degree one) Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e.
Yt (h) = At (Kt (h))
1￿  (Lt (h))
  ; 8h 2 [0;1]; (16)
Y ￿





  ; 8f 2 [0;1]; (17)
where At is the domestic productivity shock and A￿
t is the foreign productivity shock. The labor share in
4the production function is represented by 0 <   ￿ 1.2 Obviously, by consistency it should follow that the
aggregate capital accumulated by households in each country is Kt =
R 1




respectively, while aggregate labor is Lt =
R 1
0 Lt (h)dh and L￿
t =
R 1
0 Lt (f)df. Solving the cost-minimization
problem of each individual ￿rm yields an e¢ ciency condition linking the capital-to-labor ratios to factor




























; 8f 2 [0;1]; (19)






  (1 ￿  )
1￿  (Wt)
  (Zt)













1￿  : (21)
The labor force is homogenous within a country and immobile across borders, and the national labor markets
are perfectly competitive. Wages equalize in each country (but not necessarily across countries), i.e. Wt (h) =
Wt for all h 2 [0;1] and W￿
t (f) = W￿
t for all f 2 [0;1], and so does the rental rate on capital, i.e. Zt (h) = Zt
for all h 2 [0;1] and Z￿
t (f) = Z￿
t for all f 2 [0;1]. Then, since the production function is homogeneous of
degree one (constant returns-to-scale), this implies that all local ￿rms choose the same capital-to-labor ratio
(even though they may produce di⁄erent quantities in every period). Moreover, the factors of production
are compensated according to their marginal product in all ￿rms.3
We introduce a government subsidy in each country that is proportional to the local ￿rms￿production




t (f) respectively in the domestic and foreign countries. The pre-subsidy
production costs of a ￿rm are simply a fraction of the (pre-subsidy) nominal marginal costs, MCt and MC￿
t ,
in (20) ￿ (21) times the output of that ￿rm. Governments only subsidize the production of ￿rms located
in their own country, independently of whether the goods are sold locally or exported. Governments set no
2These expressions reduce to the standard case of linear-in-labor technologies if   = 1.
3The production functions in (16) ￿ (17) can be re-written as





Lt (h); 8h 2 [0;1];
Y ￿









t (f); 8f 2 [0;1];
since capital-to-labor ratios are equated across all ￿rms within a country. All households located in one country supply the
same amount of labor and capital, given that factor prices are equalized whenever the factors of production of each country are
homogeneous (though immobile across borders) and factor markets are perfectly competitive. However, since pricing decisions
are not synchronized, the amounts of labor and capital assigned to each ￿rm will di⁄er in every period. On aggregate, by the
market clearing conditions, the capital and labor demands equal their respective supplies and a measure of aggregate output















5import tari⁄s or subsidize the local demand over the export demand, hence not distorting the international
relative prices (e.g., the terms of trade and the real exchange rate). Using the pre-subsidy marginal costs
described in (20) ￿ (21), we can write the post-subsidy marginal costs that enter into the pricing decisions
of ￿rms of both countries as follows,





  (1 ￿  )
1￿  ((1 ￿ ￿t)Wt)
  ((1 ￿ ￿t)Zt)










  (1 ￿  )








1￿  : (23)
This characterization of the subsidies su¢ ces for the purpose of either reducing or eliminating the mark-up
distortions associated with monopolistic competition in the goods markets. However, we must point out that









t , which satis￿es that,







































































which show that the post-subsidy marginal costs are the same as before. However, the e¢ ciency conditions
in (18) ￿ (19) would not be the same with or without subsidies unless the wage and capital rental subsidies











In other words, we impose the assumption that both factors of production are subsidized in the same
proportion in order not to distort the allocation of capital and labor while trying to correct for the mark-up
distortions with the introduction of these subsidies. Hence, the wage Wt and the capital rental rate Zt
denote the amounts perceived by the domestic households in the supply of each factor of production, while
the wage W￿
t and the capital rental rate Z￿
t are the amounts perceived by the foreign households. In turn,
the cost of a unit of labor and the cost of renting a unit of capital are (1 ￿ ￿t)Wt and (1 ￿ ￿t)Zt for the
domestic ￿rms, and similarly (1 ￿ ￿
￿
t)W￿
t and (1 ￿ ￿
￿
t)Z￿
t are the corresponding costs for the foreign ￿rms.
The Optimal Pricing Problem. A re-optimizing domestic ￿rm h under LCP pricing chooses a domestic
and a foreign price, e Pt (h) and e P￿











e Ct;t+￿ (h) + e Xt;t+￿ (h)
￿￿

































Pt+￿ is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) for ￿-periods ahead nominal
payo⁄s (corresponding to the domestic household), subject to a pair of demand constraints in each goods
market,



























e Ct;t+￿ (h) and e C￿
t;t+￿ (h) indicate the consumption demand for any variety h at home and abroad respectively,
given that prices e Pt (h) and e P￿
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t + ￿. Similarly, e Xt;t+￿ (h) and
e X￿




























































t+￿ is the foreign SDF. The demand constraints of the foreign ￿rm are,



























given that prices e Pt (h) and e P￿
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t + ￿.
The Optimal Pricing Problem: The PCP Case. Alternatively, we keep the optimization problem of
the ￿rms as before but we replace the assumption of LCP pricing with producer-currency pricing (henceforth,
PCP pricing). This special case implies that deviations of the law of one price would not occur even if prices
are sticky in either country or in both countries. A re-optimizing domestic ￿rm h under PCP pricing chooses
a unique price expressed in the domestic currency for its own variety, e Pt (h), irrespective of whether the
variety is to be sold in the domestic market or exported to the foreign market, in order to maximize the












t;t+￿ (h) + e X￿
t;t+￿ (h)
￿￿￿
















Pt+￿ is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) for ￿-periods ahead nominal
payo⁄s (corresponding to the domestic household), subject to a pair of demand constraints in each goods
4We derive the demand for variety h in the home and foreign markets by combining the ￿rst-order conditions in (49)￿(50),
section 2.
7market,



























e Ct;t+￿ (h) and e C￿
t;t+￿ (h) indicate the consumption demand for any variety h at home and abroad respectively,
given that prices e Pt (h) and e P￿
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t + ￿. Similarly, e Xt;t+￿ (h) and
e X￿
t;t+￿ (h) indicate the households￿investment demand.5 The price paid for the domestic variety in the
foreign market expressed in units of the foreign currency, e P￿
t (h), must satisfy under PCP that Pt+￿ (h) =
St+￿P￿
t+￿ (h). Moreover, that has to be the case also when prices are sticky, i.e. e Pt (h) = St+￿ e P￿
t (h). Given




In other words, the law of one price holds at the variety level and so it does when those varieties are aggregated
in a bundle of domestic goods. However, this result holds true because the bundle of home goods is exactly
the same in the domestic and foreign country. PPP can still fail to hold at the CPI level if the aggregation
between domestic and foreign bundles of goods di⁄ers across countries (that is, if their consumption baskets
are di⁄erent) as in our model. Using the law of one price, we can re-write the demand constraints of the
domestic ￿rm jointly as follows,
￿





































































t+￿ is the foreign SDF. The demand constraints of the foreign ￿rm are,



























given that prices e Pt (h) and e P￿
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t+￿. The price paid for the foreign
variety in the domestic market expressed in units of the domestic currency, e Pt (f), must satisfy under PCP





t+￿ (f). Moreover, that has to be the case also when prices are sticky, i.e.
e Pt(f)
St+￿ = e P￿
t (f).






Using the law of one price, we can re-write the demand constraints of the foreign ￿rm jointly as follows,
￿




























1.3 The Monetary Policy Rules
The Taylor rule is often de￿ned as the trademark of modern monetary policy. In that case the policy
instrument of the domestic and foreign monetary authorities are the short-term rates It and I￿
t respectively,
while I and I
￿
are their corresponding steady state values. We assume that the monetary authorities set
short-term nominal interest rates according to Taylor (1993) type rules,
































where Mt and M￿
t are the (domestic and foreign) monetary policy shocks or the shocks to the interest rate













￿ are the output
levels in deviations from their steady state. The index captures both a smoothing term and a systematic
policy component. This index speci￿cation of the Taylor rule takes a more standard form once it is log-
linearized.
The ￿scal policy in each country is characterized by balanced budgets in every period, and a subsidy
to the production costs of the local producers that is fully ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax on households. We














where Tt and T￿
t are the domestic and foreign lump-sum taxes on households, and ￿t and ￿
￿
t are the domestic
and foreign subsidies expressed as a fraction of production costs. Given the production functions in (16)￿(17),
the pre-subsidy marginal cost equations in (20)￿(21) and the fact that capital-to-labor ratios in (18)￿(19)















  (1 ￿  )
1￿  (WtLt)
  (ZtKt)





































1￿  ; (47)









t (f)df). As these government budget constraints illustrate, the value of the subsidy can
be expressed as a share of an aggregate function of the labor income, WtLt and W￿
t L￿
t respectively, and
the capital rental income, ZtKt and Z￿
t K￿
t respectively. As expected, in the limit whenever the labor share
converges to one, i.e.   ! 1, the technology becomes linear-in-labor, and the subsidy becomes equal to a
fraction of the labor income for each country.
In Mart￿nez-Garc￿a and Słndergaard (2008) this tax subsidy is completely ignored, so the implicit as-
sumption is that ￿t = ￿
￿
t = 0 and Tt = T￿
t = 0. Often, however, these subsidies are used to neutralize the
mark-up distortion introduced by the assumption that ￿rms produce and sell their varieties under monopo-
listic competition. In order to eliminate this distortion, su¢ ces to set the subsidy in each country to satisfy
the following pair of conditions,
￿
￿ ￿ 1













which is a function of the elasticity of substitution across varieties produced within a country, i.e. ￿ > 1.
The mark-up is also a function solely of the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Since the elasticity is
time-invariant, so are the mark-ups and the subsidies (expressed as a share of the production costs) needed.
For simplicity, we treat the subsidies as a secondary policy instrument intended exclusively to deal with
the mark-up distortion and, therefore, we assume from now on that the subsidy as a fraction of the production
costs will be invariant over time and identical across countries, i.e.
￿t = ￿
￿







10where ￿ also denotes the steady state subsidy in both countries. In turn, the mark-up and the subsidy￿
independently of whether the subsidy is set to zero or neutralizes partially or totally the mark-up distortion￿
only a⁄ect the dynamics of the model up to a ￿rst-order approximation because those terms enter into the
computations of the steady state investment share. Rather than choosing a speci￿c value for the subsidy,
we view its share over the production costs as another structural parameter of the model.
2 The Optimality Conditions
Here, we present the relevant equilibrium conditions of the model. Since the model is built around two
mostly symmetric countries, all the ￿rst-order conditions reported correspond to the home country unless
otherwise noted.
The Optimality Conditions from the Households￿Problem. Given the structure described in (7)￿
(8), the solution to the sub-utility maximization problem implies that the home and foreign households￿






























t ; 8f 2 [0;1]; (50)































These equations, combined with the analogous counterparts for the foreign country, determine the demand
functions in the model.
Under complete international asset markets, the intertemporal ￿rst-order conditions for an interior solu-




















is a constant that depends on the initial conditions. The intertemporal conditions
also pin down the price of any given Arrow-Debreu security. Let It be the (gross) one-period riskless nominal
interest rate in terms of the domestic currency, and I￿
t be the corresponding rate in terms of the foreign
currency. Under complete asset markets, we can price a one-period nominal (uncontingent) bond using the






























The equilibrium conditions of the households￿problem also include a pair of labor supply functions (the




















plus the appropriate no-Ponzi games, transversality conditions, the budget constraints and the law of motions
for capital in both countries. Finally, the equilibrium conditions are completed with a pair of equations that
account for the capital-investment decisions of households. The capital-investment conditions, however,
depend on the choice of the adjustment cost function ￿(￿).


































B (st+￿) ￿ Wt+￿Lt+￿ ￿ Zt+￿Kt+￿ ￿ Prt+￿
#
￿ :::













and the capital-investment decisions can be represented with the following set of equilibrium conditions,







































Let us de￿ne Tobin￿ s q as Qt ￿ ￿t





































12Under no adjustment costs (NAC), the pair of conditions added to account for the capital-investment deci-









































The Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint
expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real shadow
value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q). In the neoclassical case is well-known that Tobin￿ s q is
exactly equal to one, as these equations prove, without adjustment costs and IST shocks.
Under capital adjustment costs (CAC), the pair of conditions added to account for the capital-investment
































































































The Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint
expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real shadow
value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q). Under investment adjustment costs (IAC), the pair of


























































































































Once again, the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real
shadow value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q).
The Optimality Conditions from the Firms￿Problem. The necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order con-






e Ct;t+￿ (h) + e Xt;t+￿ (h)
￿￿














































































































14while the price sub-indexes on foreign varieties, PF
t and PF￿






























Equations (75) ￿ (78) are a convenient way to reformulate (13) ￿ (14).
The Optimality Conditions from the Firms￿Problem: The PCP Case. The necessary and su¢ -





























5 = 0; (79)
e Pt (h) = St+￿ e P￿
t (h): (80)






































5 = 0: (82)



































while the price sub-indexes on foreign varieties, PF
t and PF￿






































Equations (83) ￿ (86) are a convenient way to reformulate (13) ￿ (14).
Aggregate Output and Real Rental Rates on Capital. Equations (49)￿(52) determine the demand
function for each variety. Those demand functions coupled with the market clearing conditions at the variety




[Ct (h) + Xt (h) + C￿

















































[Ct (f) + Xt (f) + C￿













































Equations (87)￿(88) tie the aggregate output demand in both countries to aggregate consumption, aggregate
investment as well as to optimal prices. In the PCP case where the law of one price holds at the variety




[Ct (h) + Xt (h) + C￿




























[Ct (f) + Xt (f) + C￿





























Given the production functions in (16)￿(17) and the fact that capital-to-labor ratios are equalized across
￿rms within each country, it is possible to write the following aggregate output equations,
Yt = At (Kt)
1￿  (Lt)







  : (92)
Combining these aggregate production functions with the e¢ ciency conditions in (18) ￿ (19) and the labor
supply equations from the households￿problem (as in equations (56) ￿ (57)), we can express the real rental


























































  ) : (94)
These two equations summarize the e¢ ciency condition that requires the capital-to-labor ratios to be pro-
portional to the factor price ratios. This characterization is also convenient because it implies that we do
not need to keep track of wages or labor in the simulation of this equilibrium. Manipulating the same set of
conditions a little bit more also allows us to re-write the real wages in terms of the real rental rate of capital






















































These two equations su¢ ce for the purpose of replacing real wages out of the marginal cost equations.
3 The Steady State
There is a zero-in￿ ation steady state that implies consumption gets equalized across countries, C = C
￿
,











. This normalization is customary in the literature, and often used in the background to
derive the log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions of the open-economy model with nominal rigidities.
We set the unconditional expectation of the shocks to be equal to one, i.e. A = A
￿





= 1. For the purpose of this paper, su¢ ces to consider the implications of adding capital in the
steady state.
First, we look at the steady state investment-to-capital ratio. The capital accumulation equation in (3)
(and its foreign counterpart) require that in steady state the following equalities must hold,






















Operating on the capital accumulation equations it follows that,






















￿ = ￿ because we normalize the unconditional mean
of the IST shocks to be one, i.e. V = V
￿
= 1, and because: (a) under our speci￿cation of the capital












= ￿(￿) = 1 in steady state, and (b) under












= ￿(1) = 1
in steady state. Therefore, in steady state these adjustment costs have no e⁄ect (independently of the
speci￿cation that we choose), and investment purely replaces the depreciated capital.
Second, using the fact that the investment-to-capital ratio is pined down by the depreciation rate and the
properties of the adjustment cost function ￿(￿), we can write the steady state household e¢ ciency conditions
















































= ￿0 (1) = 0,
and V = V
￿
= 1. Naturally, the steady state real rental rate on capital (which corresponds to the aggregate








￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿):
This result is quite standard in the neoclassical literature. It says that Tobin￿ s q must be equal to 1 in
steady state, and that the real rental rate on capital must be equal to the real returns on bonds (since
based on (54)￿(55) the steady state interest rate is I = I
￿
= ￿
￿1) after accounting for the e⁄ect of capital
depreciation.
Third, we look at the steady state consumption and investment shares de￿ned as ￿c ￿ C
C+X and ￿x ￿
X
C+X = 1 ￿ ￿c, respectively. The standard normalizations not only require that consumption equalizes in
steady state, but also that the real trade balance becomes zero. Therefore, it must follow from the goods
market clearing conditions that,








Using these goods market clearing conditions and the fact that in steady state the investment-to-capital






On one hand, we know from the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of the production function in (16) and the
e¢ ciency condition on the ￿rms￿problem in (18) that the capital-to-output ratio can be expressed as a
function of productivity shocks and the factor price ratio. Hence, it follows that,
￿x = ￿
￿























where A is the steady state domestic productivity shock. On the other hand, we also know that in steady
state all ￿rms charge the same price (the Calvo parameter is irrelevant) and the standard pricing formula
under monopolistic competition applies. The assumptions of LCP or PCP pricing are also irrelevant for the
determination of the steady state allocation, and have no bearing on the steady state. Hence, prices are






















Dividing this expression by P and re-arranging terms, we infer that real wages are linked to the real rental






















If we replace this expression inside the formula for the investment share ￿x obtained before we get that,
￿x = ￿
￿































Then, using the steady state real rental rate on capital, we can say that,














In other words, the investment share in steady state depends directly on the depreciation rate of capital, ￿,
and the capital share on the production function, 1￿ , and indirectly on the mark-up, ￿
￿￿1, the ￿rms￿subsidy
in steady state, ￿, and the real rental rate on capital, ￿
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). An analogous set of derivations allows
us to obtain the same expression for the investment share in the foreign country￿ under the assumption that
the steady state subsidy is the same in both countries, i.e. ￿ = ￿
￿
.
































































. Under the (symmetric) home-product bias assumption (i.e.,
￿
￿
H = ￿F), given that C = C
￿
and X = X
￿



























where the last equality follows from the steady state market clearing condition in both countries. In steady
state, the trade is balanced in real terms. However, because households have preferences for domestic as well
as foreign goods, exchanges do occur between the two countries. The parameter ￿F denotes the share of real
19domestic imports (and real foreign exports) for consumption and investment purposes relative to aggregate
output in steady state.
As noted earlier, the deterministic steady state is the same independently of whether we assume LCP
or PCP pricing because price stickiness becomes irrelevant in the steady state anyway. In the special
case in which the ￿rms￿subsidy is set at ￿ = ￿
￿
= 1
￿, then this ￿scal policy instrument su¢ ces to fully
neutralize the mark-up distortion caused by monopolistic competition. Therefore, the steady state of the
model becomes observationally identical to the steady state of a frictionless model under ￿ exible prices and
perfect competition. Such scenario is often appealing in the literature because it implies that the frictions
due to price stickiness, monopolistic competition (and LCP pricing whenever applicable) have a ￿rst-order
e⁄ect on the short-run dynamics of the economy but no e⁄ect in the long-run (in its steady state).
4 The Log-Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Here, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic, zero-in￿ ation steady state. We
denote generically b nt ￿ lnNt ￿ lnN the deviation of a variable Nt in logs from its steady state.
4.1 The Households￿Equilibrium Conditions
The log-linearization of the Euler equations in (54)￿(55) is quite standard, and characterizes the consumption-
savings decisions of the households as follows,
b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















The perfect international risk-sharing condition comes from the log-linearization of (53), i.e.
b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst: (99)
As expected, we obtain that relative consumption must be proportional to the real exchange rate.
The log-linearization of the domestic capital accumulation formula in (3) and its foreign counterpart in
the case without adjustment costs (NAC) allows us to obtain the following set of equations,






(b xt + b vt)
= (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); (100)
b k￿










t + b v￿
t)
= (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); (101)
where the second-equality follows from the steady state investment-to-capital ratio being pinned down by
the depreciation rate. Notice that b vt and b v￿
t are the investment-speci￿c technological (IST) shocks in this
model, and that their unconditional mean is normalized to one (i.e. V = V
￿
= 1).
20The log-linearization of the domestic capital accumulation formula in (3) and its foreign counterpart
under capital adjustment costs (CAC) allows us to obtain the following set of equations,
b kt+1 ￿
￿
































































































= (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t);
(103)
where the second-equality follows from the steady state properties of the CAC function, and the fact that




and V = V
￿
= 1. The log-linearization of the capital accumulation formula in (3)
and its foreign counterpart under investment adjustment costs (IAC) allows us to obtain the following set of
equations,







































= (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
(104)
b k￿







































































= (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t);
(105)
where the second-equality follows from the steady state properties of the IAC function, and the fact that




and V = V
￿
= 1. It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that we are
using three di⁄erent speci￿cations for the adjustment cost function, the log-linearized law of motion for
capital is the same in all cases. However, unlike what happens with the law of motion, the log-linearization
of the equilibrium conditions on capital-investment is not independent of the choice of the adjustment cost
function.
The Capital-Investment Decision under NAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment con-
ditions coming from the domestic households￿problem in (59) ￿ (60) are,





(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1
￿
; (106)
b qt ￿ ￿b vt; (107)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz￿





t ￿ ￿b v￿
t; (109)
where naturally b qt and b q￿
t are the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q) in each
country, and b rz
t+1 ￿ b zt+1￿b pt+1 and b rz￿
t+1 ￿ b z￿
t+1￿b p￿
t+1 denote the real rental rates on capital in the domestic
and foreign countries, respectively. This pair of equations can be re-arranged to show that,







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et (b vt+1) ￿ b vt; (110)





















by adding the Euler equations in (97)￿(98). We could interpret this pair of equations as indicating that the
real rental rate on capital (the aggregate marginal product of capital) is proportional to the real interest rate.
The two rates are not equal, however, because capital depreciates over time, while borrowing and lending
in the bond markets is not subject to the same physical depreciation. They also di⁄er because of the IST
shocks. In other words, the real interest rate should be proportional to the aggregate marginal product of
capital only if there are no adjustment costs and IST shocks.
The Capital-Investment Decision under CAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment con-
ditions coming from the domestic households￿problem in (63) ￿ (64) are,





￿ (b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz




































































(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1 + ￿￿
2￿
￿
b xt+1 ￿ b kt+1
￿￿
; (112)





































b xt ￿ b kt
￿
￿ b vt; (113)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz￿


















This pair of equations describes b qt and b q￿
t as the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or
Tobin￿ s q) in each country, b rz
t+1 ￿ b zt+1 ￿ b pt+1 and b rz￿
t+1 ￿ b z￿
t+1 ￿ b p￿
t+1 denote the real rental rates on capital
in the domestic and foreign countries, while ￿ regulates the degree of concavity of the capital adjustment
cost (CAC) function around the steady state.
22The pair of equations that relate the current and expected Tobin￿ s q to the real rental rate on capital
and the real interest rate can be re-arranged as,
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h

































by adding the Euler equations in (97)￿(98). We could interpret this pair of equations as indicating that the
di⁄erences between the real interest rate and the real rental rate on capital (the aggregate marginal product
of capital) are the result of ￿ uctuations in Tobin￿ s q. Notice that in the extreme case where there are no
adjustment costs and IST shocks (i.e., when ￿ = 0 and b vt = b v￿
t = 0), then b qt = b q￿
t = 0 for all t.
The Capital-Investment Decision under IAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment condi-
tions coming from the ￿rst-order conditions of the households￿problem in (67) ￿ (68) are,






















(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1
￿
; (118)






























￿ (b xt ￿ b xt￿1) + :::
Et
8
> > > > <



































































￿2 (b xt+1 ￿ b xt)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
= ￿[(b xt ￿ b xt￿1) ￿ ￿Et (b xt+1 ￿ b xt)] ￿ b vt; (119)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz￿



















This pair of equations summarizes b qt and b q￿
t as the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or
Tobin￿ s q) in each country, b rz
t+1 ￿ b zt+1 ￿ b pt+1 and b rz￿
t+1 ￿ b z￿
t+1 ￿ b p￿
t+1 denote the real rental rates on capital
in the domestic and foreign countries, and ￿ regulates the degree of concavity of the IAC adjustment cost
function around the steady state.
The pair of equations that relate the current and expected Tobin￿ s q to the real rental rates on capital
and the real interest rate can be re-arranged as,
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h

































23by adding the Euler equations in (97)￿(98). We could interpret this pair of equations as indicating that the
di⁄erences between the real interest rate and the real rental rate on capital are the result of ￿ uctuations in
Tobin￿ s q. These equations are almost identical to (116) and (117) except for the fact that the expectation
term on the right-hand side is diminished by (1 ￿ ￿). Hence, we conjecture that expectations about the
future play a potentially ￿ smaller￿role in the dynamics of Tobin￿ s q under the IAC speci￿cation. Notice that
in the extreme case where there are no adjustment costs and IST shocks (i.e., when ￿ = 0 and b vt = b v￿
t = 0),
then b qt = b q￿
t = 0 for all t.







Et [b xt+1] +
1
￿(1 + ￿)


















t + b v￿
t): (125)
The presence of investment adjustment costs (IAC) changes equations (119) and (121) completely. First, it
introduces an element of inertia in investment captured by the lagged terms in (124) and (125). Second, the
investment decision also becomes forward-looking, captured by the expectation term, because it becomes
costly to adjust the level of investment. The elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin￿ s q (the shadow
value of an additional unit of capital) is inversely related to the curvature of the IAC function (regulated by
￿). By contrast, investment under the assumption of capital adjustment costs (CAC) responds immediately
to movements in Tobin￿ s q as can be seen from equations (113) and (115), while the elasticity of investment
with respect to Tobin￿ s q is inversely related to the curvature of the CAC function (regulated by ￿) and the
depreciation rate (￿).
4.2 The Monetary Policy Rules
A simple log-linearization of the Taylor indexes described in equations (42) ￿ (43) gives us the following
monetary policy rules,
b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 ￿b ￿t +  yb yt
￿
+ b mt; (126)
b i￿
t ￿ ￿ib i￿









where b mt and b m￿
t denote a pair of monetary policy shocks (expressed in logs and relative to their uncon-
ditional expectations). The Taylor rule for each country is symmetric, has a smoothing component, and it
also responds to ￿ uctuations in output and in￿ ation.
4.3 The Firms￿Equilibrium Conditions
4.3.1 The Open Economy Phillips Curves
E¢ ciency Conditions and Aggregate Output. The e¢ ciency conditions can be summarized by equa-
tions (93) ￿ (94), as reported before. The log-linearization of these conditions implies that the real rental





































If we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct+￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct+￿Hb c￿
t and the relative consumption
as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). Then,






































These equations are necessary to close down the model without having to keep track of either labor or wages
explicitly.
Using the demand constraints of the domestic ￿rm in equations (27) ￿ (28), the demand constraints
of the foreign ￿rm in equations (30) ￿ (31), complemented by (51) ￿ (52) and the corresponding foreign
counterparts, it follows that the log-linearization around the steady state of the output demand for a given
￿rm, i.e. b yt (h) for a domestic ￿rm h and b y￿
t (f) for a foreign ￿rm f, takes the following form,
b yt (h) ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pW
t (h) ￿ b pW
t
￿




t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
b y￿
t (f) ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pW￿
t (f) ￿ b pW￿
t
￿




t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
where the weighted variables are,
b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t;
b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b pW
t (h) ￿ ￿Hb pt (h) + ￿F b p￿
t (h); b pW￿




t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t ; b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ;
b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t; b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t:
We de￿ne the steady state consumption and investment shares as ￿c ￿ C
C+X = 1 ￿ ￿x and ￿x ￿ X
C+X,
































t (f)df, respectively. Adding up the output market clearing conditions for all varieties
(￿rms) within each country, we obtain an expression for aggregate output in these terms,




t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW







t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t : (133)
These equations become very important in our posterior derivations of the Phillips curves. Furthermore, if













  b xW





























  b xW￿

















  b a￿
t;
(135)
These conditions can be appropriately used to simplify the description of the in￿ ation dynamics.
The Optimal Pricing Equations. In steady state the standard pricing rule under monopolistic compe-
tition holds. Accordingly, the log-linearization of the optimal pricing equations in (71), (72), (73) and (74)
can be compactly expressed as follows,





+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
hX+1
￿=0 (￿￿)













+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
hX+1
￿=0 (￿￿)
￿ (c mct+￿ ￿ b pt+￿ ￿ b rst+￿)
i
;











t+￿ ￿ b p￿























which de￿nes the distance between the optimal price decision of a given re-optimizing ￿rm and the CPI
level prevailing in each market as a weighted function of current and expected future CPI in￿ ation and real
marginal costs. Here I must recall the assumption that the government subsidy is time-invariant and equal
to its steady state value in every period, which explains why the government subsidies do not appear in the
log-linearized pricing equations. We derive the (pre-subsidy) marginal cost equations in (20) ￿ (21), and
26they can be log-linearized as,
c mct+￿ ￿   b wt+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz





t+￿ ￿   b w￿
t+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿





while the labor market clearing conditions, which are implicit in (95) ￿ (96), can be approximated as,
b wt+￿ ￿ ￿
’




































The labor market clearing conditions and the marginal costs reduce to the standard linear-in-labor case
without capital if the labor share in the production function goes to one (i.e.,   ! 1), as expected. If we











b at+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz




















t+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿







where b yt+￿ and b y￿
t+￿ re￿ ect domestic and foreign aggregate output. Finally, if we combine the marginal cost
equations with the output equations derived before in (132) ￿ (133), it follows that,
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(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿












We can use our characterization of the real marginal costs with the pricing formulas log-linearized before
27to write that,
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b e p
￿






















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW


















































(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿























￿ Et (b ￿t+￿);
b e p
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(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿























We log-linearize the price sub-indexes in (75) ￿ (76) and (77) ￿ (78) and re-arrange them to obtain that,
b e pt (h) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pH



























b e pt (f) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pF



























which is quite convenient for our purposes. We replace the isolated terms 1
￿b ct and 1
￿b c￿
t out of the marginal
cost. If we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t and the relative
consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). Hence,























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW
t+￿ + :::

















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW
t+￿ ￿ ::: ￿
￿H +
1￿ 
  (1 + ’)
￿




















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW￿
t+￿ + ::: ￿
￿H +
1￿ 
  (1 + ’)
￿

















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW￿
t+￿ ￿ :::



































Furthermore, these pricing equations can be expressed in the form of a system of expectational di⁄erence
equations. Let us focus on the ￿rst equation as an example. If we re-write the equation at time t + 1 and


























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t+1+￿ + ￿x’b xW
t+1+￿ + :::























￿ Et (b ￿t+1+￿):



















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW

























t+1 ￿ b pt+1
￿i
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW









































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿

















These equations provide a very simple characterization of the price dynamics at the price sub-index level.
Now, we use the pricing equations described above to infer the dynamics of the relative price sub-indexes
b ￿
H;R
t ￿ b ￿
H




t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ) and b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F




t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿













t ￿ b pR
t
￿













t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ ￿b rst; (137)
30where b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿



















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t + :::












































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t ￿ ::: ￿
￿H +
1￿ 
  (1 + ’)
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t + ::: ￿
￿H +
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  (1 + ’)
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t ￿ :::




























We have de￿ned the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t , and
the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t + :::
￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’


















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t ￿ ::: ￿
￿H +
1￿ 























































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t + ::: ￿
￿H +
1￿ 























































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t ￿ :::
￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’































By appropriately replacing the e¢ ciency conditions in (134)￿(135), and after a little bit of algebra, we can


































































t ￿ b pR
t
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t ￿ b pR
t
￿























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿
























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿























We de￿ne the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t . Therefore,
we easily derive the dynamics of b ￿
H;W
t ￿ b p
H;W
t ￿ b p
H;W
t￿1 and b ￿
F;W￿
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b p
F;W￿




































































































































































We de￿ne the domestic and foreign CPI indexes as b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ,
respectively. Therefore, it is easy to derive the dynamics of b ￿t ￿ b pt ￿ b pt￿1 and b ￿
￿
t ￿ b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1 from the
equations above as follows,









































t + ￿Fb xW￿
t
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t ￿ b pR
t
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t + ￿Hb xW￿
t
￿






































t ￿ b pR
t
￿i

























where world aggregate capital is de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt +￿Fb k￿
t and b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt +￿Hb k￿
t. We can also write



































































































































































































































Based on our de￿nitions of the world weighted price indexes, denoted with the superscripts W and W￿, it

















































































since b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t . Furthermore, we also know based on those same


































































































































































































35We conclude that both Phillips curves in the model take the following form,






































t + ￿Fb xW￿
t
￿























































































t + ￿Hb xW￿
t
￿








































which extends the characterization of the in￿ ation dynamics in models like those of Steinsson (2008) by
adding capital and investment. However, even though we start with an equivalent structure, our model
does not replicate exactly the Phillips curves discussed in Steinsson￿ s (2008) homogeneous labor market
model. Unlike him, whenever the labor share in the production function goes to one, we cannot eliminate




t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
on CPI in￿ ation except in the special case when there
is no home-product bias, i.e. ￿H = ￿F.














































































































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW




























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW





































Capital appears in the equation dynamics because it re￿ ects the impact of the e¢ ciency conditions on the
marginal costs of ￿rms.
Let us de￿ne b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t as the world measure of terms of trade in the model. Then, the Phillips
curves under LCP pricing can be re-expressed as,














’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW

































These equations constitute the aggregate supply block in this economy under LCP pricing.
The International Relative Prices. We have de￿ned the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +
￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t , and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿




t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
37Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :
The de￿nition of CPI in both countries, i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿





















































































Let us de￿ne b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t as the world measure of terms of trade in this model. World terms of trade
are implicitly characterized by the previous pair of equations.











t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
￿ 0 (see equation (146) for a












































































because it a⁄ects output and output enters into the speci￿cation of the Taylor rules in (126) ￿ (127).











t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ 0. In that case, this constraint
imposes no restriction on the world terms of trade b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t , and we would need to keep track of
the price sub-indexes in order to close down the model.









because it a⁄ects output in both countries and it also matters because it a⁄ects the in￿ ation dynamics through
the Phillips curves. Moreover, we can write the world terms of trade as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿












































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿




























t ￿ b pR
t
￿









where the relative CPI is de￿ned as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. If we use the de￿nition of world terms of trade and we






















where we de￿ne the ￿rst-di⁄erence of world terms of trade as ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿b tW
t￿1. This su¢ ces to close down
our model under LCP pricing. Closing the model under PCP pricing is￿ as we shall see later￿ a much
simpler proposition.
Following on Engel (forthcoming), we can show that when the degree of price stickiness is the same
across ￿rms and markets then the relative prices in each country must be equalized even if the law of one
price fails to hold, i.e.
￿
b pF






t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
. To show this, we start by computing the in￿ ation for the
















from the dynamics of the price sub-indexes in
(142) ￿ (145) as follows,
b ￿
F


























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿




















































































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿



































t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
￿ 0, hence the two expressions for
39the relative prices above become simply,
b ￿
F


















































































t ￿ b pR
t
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t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿
























Let us de￿ne the variable b zt as the di⁄erence between the relative prices in both countries, i.e. b zt ￿
￿
b pF






t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
















. Using the two



















































































































































t ￿ b pF￿
t
￿





























t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
= b zt; (158)
and, accordingly, we can re-write the expression above as,
￿b zt ￿ ￿Et (￿b zt+1) ￿ ￿b zt: (159)
Naturally, as Engel (forthcoming) emphasizes, if we combine equation (159) with the initial condition b z0 = 0,
then it has to be the case that the solution implies that the relative prices in both countries ought to equalize



























40In steady state, the relative prices of both countries do equalize as well.





























Therefore, we can re-write the world terms of trade in (156) as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿











This expression is going to be particularly helpful to simplify the equations for the real exports and real
imports later.
4.3.2 The Open Economy Phillips Curves: The PCP Case
E¢ ciency Conditions and Aggregate Output. Under PCP pricing it follows that the law of one price
holds, i.e.
b pt (h) = b st + b p￿




















t (f)df = b st + b pF￿
t ;
so the output equations in (11) ￿ (12) can be easily simpli￿ed. We notice that the weighted prices can be
re-expressed as,
b pW
t (h) ￿ b pt (h) ￿ ￿Fb st; b pW￿
t (f) ￿ b p￿
t (f) + ￿Fb st;
b p
H;W
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ ￿Fb st; b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t + ￿Fb st;
b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t; b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t;
while it follows from equations (11) ￿ (12) that the log-linearized CPIs are,
b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH









t = ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t :
The second equality comes from the assumption that the share of the home goods in the foreign aggregator
is ￿
￿
H = ￿F, while the share of the foreign goods in the foreign aggregator is ￿
￿
F = ￿H. Moreover, it follows
41that,
b p￿
t ￿ b pt ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ￿ ￿Hb pH










t ￿ b st
￿
￿ ￿Hb pH
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t
= ￿b st + ￿F b pH
t + ￿Hb pF
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t
= ￿b st + (￿F ￿ ￿H)
￿
b pH




which tells us that the real exchange rate ought to be proportional to terms of trade, i.e.
b rst = b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
b pF




Domestic terms of trade are de￿ned as the price of imports relative to the price of exports, and in the PCP
case they are computed as c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
.6 Notice that the real exchange rate does not become constant
even though the law of one price holds at the variety level in the PCP case. That is so because we also
assume that the shares of domestic and foreign goods di⁄er in the consumption baskets of each country (as
in Warnock, 2003). To close down this channel that ties real exchange rate ￿ uctuations to movements in
the terms of trade we must assume, in turn, that the consumption baskets are identical in all countries, i.e.
￿H = ￿
￿
H and ￿F = ￿
￿
F.
Therefore, the aggregate output equations in (132) ￿ (133) can be re-written under PCP as,
b yt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pH
t ￿ ￿Fb st ￿ (￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t + ￿F b pF
t
￿
￿ ￿F (b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW





t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW






t + ￿Fb st ￿ (￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








t + ￿Hb pF￿
t
￿
+ ￿F (b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿





t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
+ (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿





t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t : (165)
In other words, aggregate output depends on country-weighted consumption and investment and it also
depends on the domestic terms of trade, i.e. c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
. Given that in our model terms of trade are
proportional to the real exchange rate under PCP, we can easily re-write these equations in terms of the real
exchange rate as well.
We note that if we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct +￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct +￿Hb c￿
t and the
relative consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
6Under LCP pricing the law of one price does not hold, so we cannot use the local price of the domestic good (b pH
t ) in our
de￿nition of terms of trade and must replace it with the price of exports expressed in units of the domestic currency (b st + b pH￿
t ).
Hence, terms of trade is computed in the LCP case as c tott ￿
￿
b pF




42where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). This is



















































  b xW





























  b xW￿

















  b a￿
t:
(167)
These conditions can be appropriately used to simplify the description of the in￿ ation dynamics. The terms ￿
b p
H;W







t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
can be further simpli￿ed using the implications of the law of one price
as we have done with the aggregate output equations. However, the e¢ ciency conditions are used only to
replace out the real rental rates on capital in our characterization of the Phillips curves. The simpli￿cation
under PCP does not become very useful until we have derived the Phillips curves, so we leave it for later.
The Optimal Pricing Equations. In steady state the standard pricing rule under monopolistic compe-
tition holds. Accordingly, the log-linearization of the optimal pricing equations in (79), (80), (81) and (82)
can be compactly expressed as follows,





+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
hX+1
￿=0 (￿￿)























which de￿nes the distance between the optimal price decision of a given re-optimizing ￿rm and the CPI
level prevailing in each market as a weighted function of current and expected future CPI in￿ ation and
real marginal costs. Unlike in the LCP pricing case, there are only two prices formally set instead of
four. The prices of the exported goods of each variety from each country are determined by the price set
in the local market expressed in units of the currency of the importing country by means of the nominal
exchange rate. Hence, exchange rate pass-through is complete. Here I must recall the assumption that the
government subsidy is time-invariant and equal to its steady state value in every period, which explains why
the government subsidies do not appear in the log-linearized pricing equations. We derive the (pre-subsidy)
marginal cost equations in (20) ￿ (21), and they can be log-linearized as,
c mct+￿ ￿   b wt+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz





t+￿ ￿   b w￿
t+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿





43while the labor market clearing conditions, which are implicit in (95) ￿ (96), can be approximated as,
b wt+￿ ￿ ￿
’




































The labor market clearing conditions and the marginal costs reduce to the standard linear-in-labor case
without capital if the labor share in the production function goes to one (i.e.,   ! 1), as expected.











b at+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz




















t+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿







where b yt+￿ and b y￿
t+￿ re￿ ect domestic and foreign aggregate output. Finally, if we combine the marginal cost
equations with the output equations derived before in (132) ￿ (133), it follows that,

















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
































(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿












At this stage the marginal costs have not been simpli￿ed to take into account the fact that the law of one
price holds in the PCP case. However, this will be crucial when we simplify the Phillips Curve equations
later on.
We can use our characterization of the real marginal costs with the pricing formulas log-linearized before
to write that,





















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
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b e p
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(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
























We log-linearize the price sub-indexes in (75) ￿ (76) and (77) ￿ (78) and re-arrange them to obtain that,
b e pt (h) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pH



























44which is quite convenient for our purposes. We replace the isolated terms 1
￿b ct and 1
￿b c￿
t out of the marginal
cost. If we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t and the relative
consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). Hence,























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW
t+￿ + :::
















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t+￿ + ￿x’b xW￿
t+￿ ￿ :::


































Furthermore, these in￿ ation equations can be expressed in the form of a system of expectational di⁄erence
equations. Let us focus on the ￿rst equation as an example. If we re-write the equation at time t + 1 and

























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t+1+￿ + ￿x’b xW
t+1+￿ + :::
























￿ Et (b ￿t+1+￿):
Hence, using the computation of the conditional expectation, the pricing equation can easily be decomposed



















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW

























t+1 ￿ b pt+1
￿i
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
















We can apply the same approach (and algebraic steps) to re-write the other pricing equation as an expecta-




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿




























































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿

















These equations provide a very simple characterization of the price dynamics at the price sub-index level.
The price sub-index for imports in each country is entirely determined by the nominal exchange rate and
the price sub-index of the same bundle of goods in its local market. Naturally, the dynamics of the relative
price sub-indexes b ￿
H;R
t ￿ b ￿
H




t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ) and b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F




t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿




t ￿ b ￿
H
t ￿ b ￿
H￿
t ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1 = (b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t) + b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (168)
b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ￿ b st = (b pt ￿ b p￿
t) + b rst; (169)
b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F
t ￿ b ￿
F￿
t ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1 = (b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t) + b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (170)
b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t ￿ b st = (b pt ￿ b p￿
t) + b rst; (171)
where b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t and b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t are the relative CPI and the relative CPI in￿ ation, respectively.




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t + :::













































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t ￿ :::




























We have de￿ned the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t , and
the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW
t + ￿x’b xW
t + :::
￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’


















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿
t + ￿x’b xW￿
t ￿ :::
￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’
































By appropriately replacing the e¢ ciency conditions in (166) ￿ (167), and after a little bit of algebra, we


































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿





















































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿






















Furthermore, given that under PCP the law of one price holds at the variety level, then it must be the case
that b pH
t ￿ b st + b pH￿
t and b pF
t ￿ b st + b pF￿





t ￿ (b st ￿ b st￿1)
￿




t+1 ￿ (b st+1 ￿ b st)
￿



























































t ￿ b pR
t
￿























t + (b st ￿ b st￿1)
￿




t+1 + (b st+1 ￿ b st)
￿




























































t ￿ b pR
t
￿

























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿





















































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿






















We de￿ne the log-linearized CPI indexes of both countries as b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t +￿Hb pF￿
t .
In turn, it follows that CPI in￿ ation can be calculated as b ￿t ￿ ￿Hb ￿
H
t + ￿Fb ￿
F
t and b ￿
￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ￿
H￿
t + ￿Hb ￿
F￿
t .
Therefore, it is easy to derive the dynamics of b ￿t and b ￿
￿
t from the equations above. For domestic CPI
in￿ ation, b ￿t, it follows that,
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t ￿ b pR
t
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49and, after further re-arranging, it follows that,






































t + ￿Fb xW￿
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t ￿ b pR
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b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h

















































t + ￿Fb xW￿
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t ￿ b pR
t
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where world aggregate capital is de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt+￿Fb k￿
t. For foreign CPI in￿ ation, b ￿
￿
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t ￿ b pR
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t ￿ b pR
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￿














































































t ￿ b pR
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t ￿ b pR
t
￿


























where world aggregate capital is de￿ned as b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
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51In summary, it follows that the Phillips curves under PCP can be expressed as,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h












































t + ￿Fb xW￿
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t ￿ b pR
t
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t + ￿Hb xW￿
t
￿






































t ￿ b pR
t
￿i






















where world aggregate capital is de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt +￿Fb k￿
t and b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt +￿Hb k￿
t. We can also write



































































































































































































































Based on our de￿nitions of the world weighted price indexes, denoted with the superscripts W and W￿, it

















































































since b pt = ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t = ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t . Furthermore, we also know based on those same
































































































































































































These derivations hold true irrespective of whether the law of one price holds or not.
Finally, we conclude that both Phillips curves in the PCP model take the following form,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h













































t + ￿Fb xW￿
t
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t + ￿Hb xW￿
t
￿








































b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h




















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW


































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW




































which extends the model under PCP pricing by adding capital and investment. Let us de￿ne b tW




t as the world measure of terms of trade in the model. Then, the Phillips curves can be re-expressed as,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb xW


































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW
































Furthermore, since the law of one price holds under PCP, then it must be the case that,
b p
H;R
t ￿ b st ￿ 0; b p
F;R
t ￿ b st ￿ 0;
54so the dynamics of in￿ ation can be further simpli￿ed as,














’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW
































where we denote the ￿rst-di⁄erence on the nominal exchange rate as ￿b st ￿ b st ￿b st￿1. Alternatively, we note
that,















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb xW























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW


































The Phillip curves under PCP pricing are very similar to those under LCP pricing in (153) ￿ (154), except
for the fact that there is full nominal exchange rate pass-through into import prices under PCP.
CPI in￿ ation in each country can be expressed with the exact same present discounted value of real
marginal costs as for the LCP pricing case with an additional term that re￿ ects the direct full pass-through
of nominal exchange rate movements into import prices. That is, under LCP pricing current domestic and
55foreign in￿ ation can be expressed as,
















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW




















































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Fb xW

































while under PCP pricing current domestic and foreign in￿ ation become,
















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb xW



















































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Fb xW

































These expressions re￿ ect the role played by the LCP and PCP assumptions on the trade-o⁄between nominal
and real variables captured by the Phillips curves.
The International Relative Prices. We have de￿ned the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +
￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t , and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿




t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :
56The de￿nition of CPI in both countries, i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿





















































































Let us de￿ne b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t as the world measure of terms of trade in this model. Terms of trade are












t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
￿ 0 (see equation (146) for a demonstration), hence












































































because it a⁄ects output and output enters into the speci￿cation of the Taylor rule in (126)￿(127). Therefore,











t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ 0. In that case, this constraint imposes no
restriction on the world terms of trade b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t , and we would need to keep track of the price
sub-indexes in order to close down the model.









because it a⁄ects output in both countries and it also matters because it a⁄ects the in￿ ation dynamics.
Moreover, we can write the world terms of trade as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿


















This is going to be crucial to derive the dynamics of world terms of trade. We have shown that under PCP
57it must be the case that b p
F;R
t ￿ b p
H;R
t ￿ b st, so it follows that,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿































which is an equation that clearly ties the world terms of trade to the real exchange rate (an endogenous
variable already accounted for in the model). This relationship coupled with the de￿nition of the real
exchange rate, i.e.
￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿
t ￿ b ￿t; (178)
￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (179)
￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; (180)
su¢ ces to close the model in the PCP case. The trick here is that the world terms of trade under PCP
are tied to another observable variable (the real exchange rate), while in the LCP framework they are tied
to the real exchange rate and also to deviations from the law of one price across borders. Therefore, in
the LCP case it is necessary to model explicitly those interactions that go beyond the connection with the
real exchange rate (which is what we show in equation (157)) while that is not necessary in the PCP case.
The PCP case is much simpler because world terms of trade can be tied directly to another observable,
endogenous variable in this way.
Given that b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t, so the de￿nition of world terms of trade,
b tW
t , can be expressed as,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t = ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿






























t ￿ ￿Hb pH






t ￿ ￿F b pH￿





(1 ￿ ￿F) b pF





(1 ￿ ￿H) b pF￿
















where we make use of the approximation of the CPI indexes b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t .
Then, using the implications of the law of one price, i.e. b pH
t ￿ b st+b pH￿
t and b pF
t ￿ b st+b pF￿
t , we can immediately





































where c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
is our de￿nition of domestic terms of trade under PCP. If we put this expression
together with the expression that we just derived linking the world terms of trade to the real exchange rate,
then it immediately follows that,
2￿H￿F
￿H ￿ ￿F









b rst = (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
b pF




which gives us the conventional ￿nding under PCP implying that the real exchange rate is proportional to
domestic terms of trade. Hence, if there is no home-product bias (i.e. ￿H = ￿F), then the real exchange
rate is invariant over time.
4.4 Other Relationships
On Aggregate Output. We have shown in equations (132) and (133) that the aggregate output in each
country can be expressed as,




t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW






t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW







t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿













t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
= 0. Most notably, we can write both output equations as a function
of world terms of trade without having to keep track of any other international relative price. Using the
world terms of trade de￿nition we can write aggregate output as,
b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ; (183)
b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ; (184)
which holds true independently of whether the model assume LCP or PCP pricing. However, under PCP
pricing we can replace the world terms of trade with a measure of domestic terms of trade or with the real
exchange rate as noted before.
59This also means that world aggregate and relative output must satisfy the following conditions,
b yW



























t + ￿Fb xW￿
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t ￿ b pW￿
t
i
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)
￿
￿Hb cW






































t + ￿Hb xW￿
t
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t ￿ b pW￿
t
i
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)
￿
￿Fb cW











































t ￿ b pW￿
t
i
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)
￿
b cW










The perfect international risk-sharing condition derived in equation (99) implies that,
b cW
t ￿ b cW￿
t = (￿H ￿ ￿F)(b ct ￿ b c￿
t) ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿ b rst;
so we can re-write relative output as,
b yR





t ￿ b pW￿
t
i
+ (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿ (1 ￿ ￿x) b rst + ￿x
￿
b xW




In a model without capital and with identical preferences (i.e., if ￿H = ￿F) the relative output and the





t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
are proportional. We can use the equations
derived before for b yW
t and b yW￿
t in order to substitute out consumption in the in￿ ation dynamics equations,




t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
using the equation for relative output.
On the E¢ ciency Conditions. Using the e¢ ciency conditions in (134) and (135) and, after a little bit












  b xW
t + ￿F b rst + ￿
1+’




















  b xW￿
t ￿ ￿F b rst ￿ ￿
1+’









  b a￿
t:
This simply re-writes the previous conditions replacing the relative prices with the de￿nition of world terms
of trade. However, for the purpose of simulating the model, su¢ ces to use the expressions derived in
(134) ￿ (135) or in (166) ￿ (167).
60On Aggregate Employment. The aggregate employment can be easily derived by log-linearizing the
aggregate production equations in (91) and (92) as,
b yt ￿ b at + (1 ￿  )b kt +  b lt;
b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t + (1 ￿  )b k￿
t +  b l￿
t:
Naturally, the linear-in-labor case for employment can be derived as a special case of this log-linearized
production function in which the labor share converges to one, i.e.   ! 1.
4.4.1 On Real Exports, Real Imports, and the Net Exports Share
In a two-country model, su¢ ces to determine the net exports of the domestic country. Let us denote the
deviation of net exports / GDP from its steady state as b tbt.7 Then, because the trade balance is easily
computed as the di⁄erence between domestic aggregate output and domestic aggregate consumption and
investment (or domestic absorption) in real terms (see, e.g., Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005), we obtain that,
b tbt ￿ b yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct ￿ ￿xb xt:
Using the formula derived above for the domestic aggregate output, we obtain the following expression,
b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)[(￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t) ￿ b ct] + ￿x [(￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t) ￿ b xt]
= ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F [b ct ￿ b c￿
t] ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t ;
where b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct+￿Fb c￿
t, b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt+￿Fb x￿
t, and b xR
t ￿ b xt￿b x￿
t. Using the perfect international risk-sharing
condition in (99), we can express the net exports share as,
b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F￿ b rst ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t :
In other words, adjustment in the trade balance comes either through movements in the world terms of
trade, b tW
t , ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate, b rst, for a given relative consumption path, or from relative
adjustments in investment, b xR
t .
The real exports and imports of domestic goods in the model can be inferred from equations (49)￿(52)





t (h) + X￿





































H = ￿F under our assumption of (symmetric) home-product bias in consumption and investment.
7We use b tbt instead of the more conventional c nxt notation in order to avoid possible confusion with the investment variable.
61A simple log-linearization of both de￿nitions allows us to obtain the following pair of equations,










t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿Z 1
0






t ￿ b pt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
The log-linearization of the price sub-indexes in (13) ￿ (14) clearly implies that
R 1
0 b p￿
t (h)dh ￿ b pH￿
t and
R 1
0 b pt (f)dh ￿ b pF
t . Therefore, relative price dispersion at the variety level has no ￿rst-order e⁄ects, and we
can re-write the export and import equations as,
d expt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pH￿
t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
We have de￿ned the world price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ,
and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write
that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :
Using these de￿nitions, it is possible to express the relative prices embedded in the de￿nition of real exports
and imports in the following terms, i.e.
b pH￿



























t ￿ b pt = b p
F;W￿



















where the world terms of trade is de￿ned as b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t . The de￿nition of CPI in both countries,
i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿





















































































Using the second equality derived above and the de￿nition of the world terms of trade, we can write the
relative prices embedded in the de￿nition of real exports and imports in the following terms, i.e.
b pH￿























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿i
= ￿(￿H + ￿F)b tW
t = ￿b tW
t :









t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ ￿F [(1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿




t ￿ b pt
￿










t ￿ b pt
￿￿
+ ￿F [(1 ￿ ￿x)(b c￿
t ￿ b ct) + ￿x (b x￿
t ￿ b xt)]
= ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F [b ct ￿ b c￿
t] ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t ￿ b tbt;
where relative investment is de￿ned as b xR
t ￿ b xt ￿ b x￿
t. In other words, our measure of the trade balance
is equivalent to the di⁄erence between the log of real exports and imports (in deviations relative to their
respective steady states), scaled by the parameter ￿F. In the deterministic steady state of our model,
it follows easily that the parameter ￿F denotes the share of domestic imports (and foreign exports) for
consumption and investment purposes relative to aggregate output.
Real exports and real imports can be re-written in the following form,








t ￿ b pR
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;





t ￿ b pR
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt;
63or, simply, as,









t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (185)









t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (186)




t ￿ b pR
t
￿
to the world terms of trade b tW
t ￿ in order
to express the real imports and real exports more compactly as follows,









t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (187)









t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (188)
or,
d expt ￿ ￿
￿




t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿








t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (189)
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿











t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (190)
These two equations tell us that the strength of the demand for consumption and investment purposes is
likely to have a major impact on both exports and imports. However, they also tell us that exports and
imports depend on world terms of trade, b tW
t , which is the sole variable that summarizes the impact of
international relative prices on both real exports and real imports in the context of our model.
The world terms of trade, b tW
t , can be expressed in terms of the relative price of each country as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t = ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
















t ￿ ￿Hb pH






t ￿ ￿F b pH￿




























while using the de￿nition of the CPI for both countries, i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t .
64We can re-write the real exchange rate, b rst, as,
b rst = b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt
￿ b st +
￿
￿F b pH￿






t + ￿F b pF
t
￿
= b st +
￿
(1 ￿ ￿H) b pH￿











b st + b pH￿
















The international relative price e⁄ect on trade can be partly captured by the cost of replacing one unit of
the foreign good with one unit of the exported domestic good, i.e. it is partly a function of the domestic
terms of trade c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
. If the law of one price holds (as it is the case under PCP pricing),
then we can express domestic terms of trade as the opportunity cost of replacing one unit of the foreign
good with one unit of the domestic good sold locally, c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
, since b pH
t ￿ b st + b pH￿
t . However, in
the LCP pricing case we have to use the de￿nition of world terms of trade, b tW
t , to re-write the real exchange
rate, b rst, as a function of domestic and world terms of trade as follows,







We easily see that world terms of trade, b tW
t , can be expressed now as a function of the domestic terms of
trade, c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t
￿




c tott + b rst
￿
: (191)
The advantage of this transformation is that the world terms of trade can be expressed as a linear function
of domestic terms of trade and the real exchange rate which are both measurable in the data￿ unlike world
terms of trade itself. Hence, the trade balance, the real export and the real import equations can all be
re-expressed in terms of international relative prices that are easier to match with the data even in the
presence of nominal rigidities and LCP pricing (that is, even when the law of one price does not hold).
4.4.2 On Real Exports and Real Imports: The PCP Case
The real exports and imports of domestic goods in the model can be inferred from equations (49)￿(52) and





t (h) + X￿





































H = ￿F under our (symmetric) assumption of home-product bias in consumption and investment.
In a two-country model, the real exports of the home country are clearly equal to real imports of the foreign
country. Similarly, the real imports of the home country are equal to the real exports of the foreign country.
From the background on equations (185)￿(186), we know that real exports and imports can be log-linearized
65as,
d expt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pH￿
t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
It is evident that this approximation follows from the description of real export and real import functions
presented before.
The de￿nition of CPI in both countries, i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t , allows us to
express these two linearized equations also as,
d expt ￿ ￿￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿F) b pH￿
t ￿ ￿Hb pF￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿





t ￿ b pF￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿F) b pF
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t
￿




t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
In a model under PCP where the law of one price holds we know that,
b pH
t ￿ b st + b pH￿
t ;
b pF
t ￿ b st + b pF￿
t ;
which in turn allows us to re-write the expressions for exports and imports in the following terms,
d expt ￿ ￿￿￿H
￿￿





b st + b pF￿
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿





t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿￿H
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:





t ￿ b pH
t
￿
(see for a demonstration equation (181)), then we obtain exactly the same real
export and real import equations we have derived here.
The equations for real exports and real imports re￿ ect two well-known forces on the demand-side, the
international relative price e⁄ects and the income / wealth e⁄ects. The income e⁄ect is captured by the overall
demand for consumption and investment (the absorption), respectively (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt and (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t +
￿xb x￿
t in each country. The international relative price e⁄ect is a function of the cost of replacing one unit




t ￿ b pH
t
￿
. The impact of domestic terms of trade is symmetric in size but enters with opposite sign
for imports and exports. Alternatively, we can express real imports and real exports as follows,





b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (192)





b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt; (193)
since we already know that the real exchange rate is proportional to domestic terms of trade in the PCP
66case. It is easy to see that the real net exports share can then be expressed as,
b tbt ￿ ￿F
￿







b rst + ￿F ((1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿






b rst ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F (b ct ￿ b c￿







b rst ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F￿ b rst ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t ;
where b xR
t ￿ b xt ￿ b x￿
t and the last equality follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in
(99). This is the standard expression for the trade balance under PCP pricing.
Naturally, if these export and import equations are embedded in an otherwise symmetric model, we can
expect exports and imports to have a negative correlation if the international relative price e⁄ect is strong
but to display otherwise symmetric business cycle properties (i.e., volatility and even persistence).
5 An Extension: The Role of Capacity Utilization
For this extension, we follow the de￿nition of variable capacity utilization as presented in Christiano, et al.
(2005).
5.1 The Structure of the Model
5.1.1 The Intertemporal Consumption and Savings Problem
We assume that both countries have unrestricted access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded
internationally. The domestic household maximizes its lifetime utility in (1) subject to the sequence of
budget constraints described by,
Pt
￿












+ WtLt + ZtUt e Kt + Prt; (194)
and the law of motion for physical capital,
e Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) e Kt + Vt￿(Xt;Xt￿1;Kt)Xt; (195)
where Wt is the domestic nominal wage, Pt is the domestic CPI, Prt are the nominal pro￿ts generated
by the domestic ￿rms, and Tt is a lump-sum nominal tax levied on the domestic households. Moreover,
Xt is domestic real investment, e Kt stands for domestic physical capital, Zt de￿nes the nominal rental rate
on capital services, Prt are the nominal pro￿ts generated by the domestic ￿rms, and Vt is the domestic
investment-speci￿c technological (IST) shock. Money can be thought as playing the role of a unit of account
only.
We denote st+1 the event that occurs at time t+1 and st+1 = (st;st+1) the history of events up to that
point. The households￿portfolio includes a complete set of one-period contingent claims (Arrow-Debreu
securities), traded internationally and quoted in units of the domestic currency. Households have unrestricted
access to all contingent claims, Pb ￿
st j st￿1￿
is the domestic price at time t￿1 of the contingent claim that





St is the corresponding price in foreign currency units. St
denotes the nominal exchange rate, B (st) is the nominal pay-o⁄ received by the domestic households after
the event st occurs at time t on a contingent claim purchased at time t￿1 (which would have paid nothing
if event st had not happened).
Capital services, Kt, are related to physical capital, e Kt, by,
Kt = Ut e Kt: (196)
Here, Ut denotes the utilization rate of physical capital, which we assume is set by the households. ZtUt e K
represents the domestic households￿earnings from supplying capital services. The increasing, convex func-
tion, A(Ut) e Kt, denotes the cost, in units of consumption goods, of setting the utilization rate Ut above its
long-run steady state of one (over-utilization). The cost is scaled by the size of the stock of physical capital.
In turn, whenever the utilization rate is set below one (under-utilization), the function now indicates the
units of consumption goods that the household can re-allocate for other purposes like consumption, invest-
ment, or net borrowing. The foreign households maximize their lifetime utility subject to an analogous
sequence of budget constraints, the same law of motion for physical capital, and the same linear relationship
between physical capital and capital services.
Physical capital accumulation may be subject to adjustment costs too. We consider three special cases:
the capital adjustment cost (CAC) case in (5), the investment adjustment cost (IAC) in (6), and the case
with no adjustment costs (NAC). We de￿ne capital adjustment costs in terms of capital services rather
than physical capital because we want to capture the idea that setting utilization rates can also in￿ uence
how costly it becomes to accumulate physical capital. However, this distinction does not matter under IAC
adjustment costs. All other assumptions of the model are maintained in this extension.
The home and foreign consumption bundles of the domestic household, CH
t and CF
t , as well as the
investment bundles, XH
t and XF
t , are aggregated by means of the CES indexes in (7)￿(8), while aggregate
consumption and investment, Ct and Xt, are de￿ned with the CES indexes in (9) ￿ (10). Under standard
results on functional separability, the CPI indexes which correspond to our speci￿cation of aggregators for
consumption and investment are (11) ￿ (12), and the price sub-indexes are (13) ￿ (14). An analogous set
of consumption and investment aggregators for the foreign household and price indexes and sub-indexes for
the foreign market apply. We still de￿ne the real exchange rate as in (15).
5.1.2 The Firms￿Problem and Monetary Policy
Neither the problem of the ￿rms￿nor the simple monetary policy rules proposed by Taylor (1993) do change
in this environment with variable capital utilization. The only point that is worth emphasizing is that ￿rms
in this model rent capital services rather than physical capital. Therefore, the capital utilization rate set by
the households and the physical capital they accumulate will have an impact on the ￿rms￿marginal costs
by in￿ uencing the overall amount of capital services supplied in equilibrium. Everything else is unchanged.
We assume that production employs a (homogeneous of degree one) Cobb-Douglas technology as in
(16) ￿ (17). Solving the cost-minimization problem of each individual ￿rm yields an e¢ ciency condition
linking the capital-services-to-labor ratios to factor price ratios in each country as in (18) ￿ (19), as well as
a characterization for the (pre-subsidy) marginal costs as in (20)￿(21). The government subsidizes ￿rms as
68in (22) ￿ (23), and each country fully ￿nances its subsidies with a lump-sum tax on households as speci￿ed
in the government budget constraints in (44)￿(45). The ￿rm subsidy is time-invariant and common across
countries as in (48).
A re-optimizing domestic ￿rm h under LCP chooses a domestic and a foreign price, e Pt (h) and e P￿
t (h),
to maximize the expected discounted value of its net pro￿ts in (26), subject to a pair of demand constraints
in each goods market in (27) ￿ (28). Similarly, we characterize the objective of the foreign ￿rm f under
LCP pricing as in (29), subject to the demand constraints in (30) ￿ (31). A re-optimizing domestic ￿rm h
under PCP chooses a price in domestic currency, e Pt (h), to maximize the expected discounted value of its
net pro￿ts in (32), subject to a joint demand constraint for both goods market as in (36). Similarly, we
characterize the objective of the foreign ￿rm f under PCP pricing as in (37), subject to the joint demand
constraint of the foreign ￿rm in (41). Naturally, the law of one price still holds under PCP.
The Taylor rule is often de￿ned as the trademark of modern monetary policy. We assume that the
monetary authorities set short-term nominal interest rates according to Taylor (1993) type rules as in (42)￿
(43).
5.2 The Optimality Conditions
Here, we present the relevant equilibrium conditions of the model only when they di⁄er from those reported
before.
The Optimality Conditions from the Households￿Problem. Given the structure described in (7)￿
(8), the solution to the sub-utility maximization problem implies that the home and foreign households￿
demands for each variety are given by (49) ￿ (50), while the demands for the bundles of home and foreign
goods are given by (51) ￿ (52). Under complete international asset markets, the intertemporal ￿rst-order
conditions for an interior solution result in the well-known perfect international risk-sharing condition derived
in (53).
Let It be the (gross) one-period riskless nominal interest rate in terms of the domestic currency, and
I￿
t be the corresponding interest rate in terms of the foreign currency. Under complete international asset
markets, we can price a one-period nominal (uncontingent) bond using the price of the contingent claims






























which are exactly the same Euler equations that we derived in (54)￿(55). The equilibrium conditions of the
households￿problem also include a pair of labor supply functions (the intratemporal ￿rst-order conditions)
which can be expressed as in (56)￿(57), plus the appropriate no-Ponzi games, transversality conditions, the
budget constraints, the laws of motion for physical capital in both countries, and the linear transformation
functions between physical capital and capital services. Finally, the equilibrium conditions are completed
with a number of equations that account for the capital-investment decisions of households. The capital-
69investment equilibrium conditions, however, depend on the choice of the adjustment cost function ￿(￿).




























Ct+￿ + Xt+￿ + A(Ut+￿) e Kt+￿
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+ Tt+￿ + Et [Mt+￿;t+￿+1Bt+￿+1] ￿ :::

























and with the following set of equilibrium conditions,












(1 ￿ ￿) + Vt+1
@￿(Xt+1;Xt;Ut+1 e Kt+1)







































Let us de￿ne Tobin￿ s q as Qt ￿ ￿t













Pt+1Ut+1 ￿ A(Ut+1) + :::
Qt+1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + Vt+1
@￿(Xt+1;Xt;Ut+1 e Kt+1)
























































Under no adjustment costs (NAC), the set of conditions added to account for the capital-investment decisions
















































































The Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint
expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real shadow
value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q). In the case without adjustment costs (NAC) Tobin￿ s q
is exactly equal to one, if there are no IST shocks.
Under capital adjustment costs (CAC), the set of conditions added to account for the capital-investment












Pt+1Ut+1 ￿ A(Ut+1) + :::
Qt+1
￿







































































































































































































The Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint
expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real shadow
value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q).
Under investment adjustment costs (IAC), the set of conditions added to account for the capital-





















































































































































Once again, the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion relative to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint expressed in real terms, denoted Qt and Q￿
t respectively, has the interpretation of being the real
shadow value of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q).
The Optimality Conditions from the Firms￿Problem. The necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order con-
ditions for the domestic ￿rm producing variety h under LCP pricing give us the pair of price-setting formulas
in (71)￿(72). Similarly, the ￿rst-order conditions for the foreign ￿rm producing variety f under LCP pricing
give us the pair of price-setting formulas in (73) ￿ (74). Using the law of large numbers and the inherent





t , become equal to those reported in equations (75) ￿ (78).
The necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order conditions for the domestic ￿rm producing variety h under PCP
pricing give us the price-setting formula in (79). Similarly, the ￿rst-order conditions for the foreign ￿rm
producing variety f under PCP pricing give us the price-setting formula in (82). Using the law of large





t , become equal to those reported in equations (83) ￿ (86).
Aggregate Output and Rental Rates on Capital. Equations (49) ￿ (52) determine the demand
function for each variety. Those demand functions coupled with the market clearing conditions at the
72variety level allows us to calculate the aggregate output from the demand-side as follows,
Yt ￿ A(Ut) e Kt =
Z 1
0
[Ct (h) + Xt (h) + C￿



















































[Ct (f) + Xt (f) + C￿













































Equations (218) ￿ (219) tie the aggregate output in both countries to consumption as well as to relative
prices, after adjusting for the costs of capital utilization. When the utilization costs are set equal to zero,
these aggregate output equations correspond exactly to those reported in (87) ￿ (88).
Given the production functions in (16)￿(17) and the fact that capital-services-to-labor ratios are equalized
across ￿rms within a country, it is possible to write the aggregate output equations as in (91) ￿ (92).
Combining these aggregate production functions with the e¢ ciency conditions in (18) ￿ (19) and the labor
supply equations from the households￿problem (as in equations (56) ￿ (57)), we can express the real rental
rates on capital services in terms of productivity shocks, consumption, output and capital services as in
equations (93) ￿ (94). Manipulating the same set of conditions a little bit further also allows us to re-write
the real wages in terms of real rental rates on capital services as well as productivity shocks, consumption,
output and capital services as in equations (95)￿(96). Those two e¢ ciency equations su¢ ce for the purpose
of replacing real wages out of the marginal cost equations, as before.
5.3 The Steady State
We impose two restrictions on the utilization cost function A(￿) in steady state. First, we require that the
rate of utilization is set at U = U
￿





. In other words, physical capital and capital services are equated in steady state. Second, we








= 0. Hence, in steady state, the capital utilization cost drops
from the ￿rst-order conditions (200) and (203), (206) and (209), and (212) and (215). Furthermore, it also
drops from the steady state market clearing conditions implied by (218) ￿ (219).

















These expressions are derived under the NAC version of the model without capital adjustment costs. For
the CAC case, we can derive exactly the same steady state conditions from equations (208) and (211), and
the same can be said for the IAC case based on equations (214) and (217). Hence, the steady state with
capital utilization is essentially identical to that without capital utilization that we have described earlier.


















￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿);
where the second equality follows from our derivations of the steady state real rental rates on capital services.
5.4 The Log-Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Here, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic zero-in￿ ation steady state. We
only report those equations that di⁄er from our previous derivations. For instance, we maintain the exact
same speci￿cation of the Taylor (1993) rules described in (126)￿(127) as our benchmark for monetary policy.
5.4.1 The Households￿Equilibrium Conditions
The log-linearization of the Euler equations and the perfect international risk-sharing condition is the same
as reported in equations (97) ￿ (99), i.e.
b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst: (222)
The log-linearization of the domestic capital accumulation formula in (195) and its foreign counterpart in
the case without adjustment costs (NAC) is una⁄ected by the addition of variable capital utilization. Hence,
simple re-labeling allows us to conclude that,
b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); (223)
b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); (224)
where b e kt and b e k
￿
t denote the physical capital, and b vt and b v￿
t are the IST shocks.
The log-linearization of the domestic capital accumulation formula in (195) and its foreign counterpart
under capital adjustment costs (CAC) allows us to obtain the following set of equations,
b e kt+1 ￿
￿


























































































































= (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t);
74where the second-equality follows from the steady state properties of the CAC function, and the fact that




and V = V
￿
= 1. The log-linearization of the capital accumulation formula in (195)
and its foreign counterpart under investment adjustment costs (IAC) allows us to obtain the following set of
equations,









































= (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
b k￿







































































= (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t);
where the second-equality follows from the steady state properties of the IAC function, and the fact that




and V = V
￿
= 1. In spite of the fact that we are using three di⁄erent speci￿cations for
the adjustment cost function ￿(￿) and that we allow for variable capital utilization, the log-linearized law of
motion for physical capital is the same in all cases.
A ￿rst-order approximation of the link between capital services and physical capital in (196) also gives
us the following relationships between these two variables,
b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
t + b e k
￿
t;
where b kt and b k￿
t denote the capital services.
The Capital-Investment Decision under NAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment equi-
librium conditions coming from the domestic households￿problem in (200) ￿ (201) is as follows,

























(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))b rz
t+1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) b qt+1
￿
; (225)
b qt ￿ ￿b vt; (226)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))b rz￿





t ￿ ￿b v￿
t; (228)
where b qt and b q￿
t are the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or Tobin￿ s q) in each country.
These are the same equations derived under no capital utilization in (106) ￿ (109).
75These capital-investment equations can be re-arranged to show that,







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿
+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et [b vt+1] ￿ b vt; (229)

















































￿) and U = U
￿
= 1. These two ￿rst-order conditions link the real rental rate
on capital services to the capital utilization choice made by households.
The Capital-Investment Decision under CAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment equi-
librium conditions coming from the domestic households￿problem in (206) ￿ (207) are as follows,
b qt ￿ Et
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
￿ 1
￿ (b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1 + ￿￿
2￿
￿











































































> > > > > > > > > > =






(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1 + ￿￿
2￿
￿
b xt+1 ￿ b e kt+1 ￿ b ut+1
￿￿
;(233)
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿












































5 b ut ￿ b vt
= ￿￿
￿
b xt ￿ b e kt ￿ b ut
￿
￿ b vt; (234)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz￿





t+1 ￿ b e k
￿








t ￿ b e k
￿





This system of equations describes b qt and b q￿
t as the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or
Tobin￿ s q) in each country, and ￿ regulates the degree of concavity of the capital adjustment cost (CAC)
function around the steady state.
The pair of equations that relate the current and expected Tobin￿ s q to the real rental rate on capital
76services and the real interest rate can be re-arranged as,
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h

































by adding the Euler equations in (97) ￿ (98). These equations are exactly the same ones that we found in
(116) ￿ (117). We can re-write (234) and (236) in terms of capital services as,
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿












These equations are e⁄ectively the same ones that we derived in (113)￿(115). Finally, we approximate the
￿rst-order conditions on capital utilization in (208) and (211) that complete the model as follows,
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= Et
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b xt+1 ￿ b e kt+1 ￿ b ut+1
￿
9
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￿￿
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￿￿















1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
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b x￿
t+1 ￿ b e k
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1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
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These ￿rst-order conditions on capital utilization are similar to those derived in the NAC case (equations
(231) ￿ (232)), but they show that the real rental rates on capital services are tied to capital utilization,
Tobin￿ s q and the IST shocks as well. The extra term on the right-hand side￿ which is proportional to
Tobin￿ s q and the IST shock￿ is the result of having assumed that the capital adjustment cost function
penalizes the size of investment relative to capital services in each period, rather than the size of investment
relative to physical capital.
The Capital-Investment Decision under IAC. The log-linearization of the capital-investment equi-
librium conditions coming from the ￿rst-order conditions of the households￿problem in (212)￿(213) are as
78follows,







(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1 +
h
Z




















(b ct+1 ￿ b ct) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b qt+1
￿
; (241)






























￿ (b xt ￿ b xt￿1) + :::
Et
8
> > > > <



































































￿2 (b xt+1 ￿ b xt)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
= ￿[(b xt ￿ b xt￿1) ￿ ￿Et (b xt+1 ￿ b xt)] ￿ b vt; (242)









t+1 ￿ b c￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)b rz￿



















This system of equations summarizes b qt and b q￿
t as the real shadow values of an additional unit of capital (or
Tobin￿ s q) in each country, and ￿ regulates the degree of concavity of the investment adjustment cost (IAC)
function around the steady state.
The pair of equations that relate the current and expected Tobin￿ s q to the real rental rates on capital
and the real interest rate can be re-arranged as,
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h

































by adding the Euler equations in (97) ￿ (98). Finally, we re-write equations (242) and (244) in a more







Et [b xt+1] +
1
￿(1 + ￿)


















t + b v￿
t): (248)
The presence of investment adjustment costs (IAC) changes equations (242) and (244) completely. These
equations are the same equations derived before without capital utilization in (122)￿(125). Capital utiliza-



























￿) and U = U
￿
= 1. These conditions link the real rental rates on capital to
the capital utilization choice, and they are identical to the equilibrium conditions derived in the case without
adjustment costs (NAC).
5.4.2 The Firms￿Equilibrium Conditions: The LCP Case
E¢ ciency Conditions and Aggregate Output. The e¢ ciency conditions can be described by the same
pair of equations reported in (134) ￿ (135) (or in (166) ￿ (167)). Those e¢ ciency conditions are necessary
to close down the model without having to keep track of either labor or wages explicitly. Using the demand
constraints of the domestic ￿rm in equations (27) ￿ (28), the demand constraints of the foreign ￿rm in
equations (30) ￿ (31), complemented by (51) ￿ (52) and their corresponding foreign counterparts, it follows
that the log-linearization around the steady state of output demand for a given re-optimizing ￿rm, i.e. b yt (h)
for a domestic ￿rm h and b y￿
t (f) for a foreign ￿rm f, takes the following form,
b yt (h) ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pW
t (h) ￿ b pW
t
￿




t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
b y￿
t (f) ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pW￿
t (f) ￿ b pW￿
t
￿




t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
where the weighted variables are,
b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t;
b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b pW
t (h) ￿ ￿Hb pt (h) + ￿F b p￿
t (h); b pW￿




t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t ; b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ;
b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t; b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t:
We de￿ne the steady state consumption and investment shares as ￿c ￿ C
C+X = 1 ￿ ￿x and ￿x ￿ X
C+X,
respectively. These expressions hold true independently of whether we assume LCP pricing or PCP pricing,
although the price indexes and sub-indexes can be further simpli￿ed in the PCP case (where the law of one
price holds).
































t (f)df, respectively. Adding up the output market clearing conditions for all varieties
(￿rms) within each country and adjusting for the capital utilization costs, as per equations (218) ￿ (219),















t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW






























t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;














t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW



















t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t :










where physical capital and capital services are equated because the utilization rate is set to U = U
￿
= 1.
Therefore, we can re-express the aggregate output equations in the following terms,




t ￿ b pW
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t + ￿x
￿









t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿





These equations become very important in our posterior derivations of the Phillips curves. Equations (251)￿
(252) are identical to those derived in the model without capital utilization in (132) ￿ (133) only when
b ut = b u￿
t = 0. These equations calculate aggregate output from the demand-side by incorporating the capital
utilization costs at the same time.
We note that if we de￿ne the world weighted consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct+￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct+￿Hb c￿
t
and the relative consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). This is





















































































































  b a￿
t:
(254)
These conditions can be appropriately used to simplify the description of the in￿ ation dynamics.
The Optimal Pricing Equations. In steady state the standard pricing rule under monopolistic compe-
tition holds. Accordingly, the log-linearization of the optimal pricing equations in (71), (72), (73) and (74)
can be compactly expressed as follows,





+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
hX+1
￿=0 (￿￿)













+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
hX+1
￿=0 (￿￿)
￿ (c mct+￿ ￿ b pt+￿ ￿ b rst+￿)
i
;











t+￿ ￿ b p￿























which gives us the same pricing formulas that we obtained before without capital utilization. Here I must
recall the assumption that the government subsidy is time-invariant and equal to its steady state value
in every period, which explains why the government subsidies do not appear in the log-linearized pricing
equations. We derive the (pre-subsidy) marginal cost equations in (20)￿(21), and they can be log-linearized
as,
c mct+￿ ￿   b wt+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz





t+￿ ￿   b w￿
t+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿





while the labor market clearing conditions, which are implicit in (95) ￿ (96), can be approximated as,
b wt+￿ ￿ ￿
’















































b at+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz




















t+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿







where b yt+￿ and b y￿
t+￿ denote domestic and foreign aggregate output. Up to this point, the derivation of
marginal costs is the same independently of whether the model allows for capital utilization or not. If we
combine the marginal cost equations with the output equations derived before in (251) ￿ (252), it follows
that,

















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW





































(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿


















This characterization of the real marginal costs is central to our derivations of the Phillips curve. It naturally
shows that now marginal costs have to account for the costs of variable capital utilization.
We can use our characterization of the real marginal costs with the pricing formulas log-linearized before
83to write that,
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￿ Et (b ￿t+￿);
b e p
￿
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(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿



























￿ Et (b ￿t+￿);
b e p
￿
























(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
































We log-linearize the price sub-indexes in (75) ￿ (76) and (77) ￿ (78) and re-arrange them to obtain that,
b e pt (h) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pH



























b e pt (f) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pF



























which is quite convenient to aggregate the optimal pricing decision of ￿rms. We replace the isolated terms
1
￿b ct and 1
￿b c￿
t out of the marginal cost. If we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t and
84b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t and the relative consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). Hence,
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b ut+￿ + :::
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿











































Furthermore, these pricing equations can be expressed in the form of a system of expectational di⁄erence
equations. Let us focus on the ￿rst equation as an example. If we re-write the equation at time t + 1 and


























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW






b ut+1+￿ + :::

























￿ Et (b ￿t+1+￿):
Hence, using the properties of the conditional expectation, the pricing equation can easily be decomposed
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b ut + :::




























t+1 ￿ b pt+1
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b ut + :::
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿











  (1 + ’)
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿




























These equations provide a very simple characterization of the dynamics at the price sub-index level.
Now, we use the pricing equations described above to infer the dynamics of the relative price sub-indexes
b ￿
H;R
t ￿ b ￿
H




t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ) and b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F




t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿













t ￿ b pR
t
￿













t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ ￿b rst; (256)
where b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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We have de￿ned the world weighted price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t +￿Hb pF￿
t ,
and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write
that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world weighted CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t, and
the relative CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿
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1+(1￿ )’


































By appropriately replacing the e¢ ciency conditions in (253)￿(254), and after a little bit of algebra, we can




























































b ut + :::






















t ￿ b pR
t
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b ut ￿ :::






















t ￿ b pR
t
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t ￿ b pR
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t ￿ b pR
t
￿

























We de￿ne the world weighted price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t .
Therefore, we easily derive the dynamics of b ￿
H;W
t ￿ b p
H;W
t ￿ b p
H;W
t￿1 and b ￿
F;W￿
t ￿ b p
F;W￿















































































































































































































We de￿ne the domestic and foreign CPI indexes as b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t ,
respectively. Therefore, it is easy to derive the dynamics of b ￿t ￿ b pt ￿ b pt￿1 and b ￿
￿
t ￿ b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1 from the
91pricing equations above as follows,
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿






































t ￿ b pR
t
￿i



























where world weighted capital is de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t and b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t. We can also write



































































































































































































































Based on our de￿nitions of the world weighted price indexes and sub-indexes, denoted with the superscripts

















































































since b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t . Furthermore, we also know based on those same

































































































































































































We conclude that both Phillips curves in the model take the following form,


























































[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿













































































































[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿











































93which extends the speci￿cation in models like those of Steinsson (2008) by adding capital, investment, and
variable capital utilization.
















































































































































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::



























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::



































Capital appears in the Phillips curves because it re￿ ects the impact of the e¢ ciency conditions on the
marginal costs of ￿rms. A similar argument can be made regarding the role of capital utilization on the
amount of capital services made available to ￿rms.
Let us de￿ne b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t as the world measure of terms of trade in the model. Then, the Phillips
94curves under LCP pricing can be re-expressed as,
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￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::































These equations constitute the aggregate supply block in this economy under LCP pricing.





t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
as the world measure of terms
of trade in this model. As in the model under LCP without capital utilization in (155), the only constraint
































matters because it a⁄ects aggregate output and aggregate output enters into the speci￿cation of the monetary











t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ 0. In that case, the





t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
, and we need
to keep track of the price sub-indexes in some other way in order to close down the model.









because it a⁄ects aggregate output in both countries, and it also matters because it a⁄ects the real marginal
costs of ￿rms. Moreover, we can write the world terms of trade as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿


















This expression is crucial to derive the dynamics of world terms of trade. In equations (255) and (256)
we already derived a simple characterization for the relative price sub-indexes b ￿
H;R
























































t ￿ b pR
t
￿




























t ￿ b pR
t
￿









where the relative CPI is de￿ned as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. If we use the de￿nition of world terms of trade and we





























where we de￿ne the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the world terms of trade as ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1. This su¢ ces to close
down our model under LCP pricing, but it is the same equation as in (157) without variable utilization.
Following on Engel (forthcoming), we can show that when the degree of price stickiness is the same
across ￿rms and markets then the relative prices in each country must be equalized even if the law of one
price fails to hold, i.e.
￿
b pF






t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
. To show this, we start by computing the in￿ ation for the
















from the dynamics of the price sub-indexes in
(261) ￿ (264) as follows,
b ￿
F





































































t ￿ b ut) + :::





































t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿



































































































t ￿ b ut) ￿ :::





































t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿






































t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
￿ 0, hence the two expressions for
the relative prices above become simply,
b ￿
F




































































t ￿ b ut) + :::






























t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿

































































































t ￿ b ut) ￿ :::






























t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿


























Let us de￿ne the variable b zt as the di⁄erence between the relative prices in both countries, i.e. b zt ￿
￿
b pF






t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
















. Using the two



















































































































































t ￿ b pF￿
t
￿





























t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
= b zt; (277)
and, accordingly, we can re-write the expression above as,
￿b zt ￿ ￿Et (￿b zt+1) ￿ ￿b zt: (278)
Naturally, as Engel (forthcoming) emphasizes, if we combine equation (278) with the initial condition b z0 = 0,
then it has to be the case that the solution implies that the relative prices in both countries ought to equalize
























































Therefore, we can re-write the world terms of trade in (275) as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿











This simpli￿cation is exactly the same one that we derived in a model without variable capacity utilization
in (163), indicating that our result is not sensitive to the addition of utilization into the model.
5.4.3 The Firms￿Equilibrium Conditions: The PCP Case
E¢ ciency Conditions and Aggregate Output. The aggregate output equations in (251) ￿ (252) can
be simpli￿ed under PCP￿ because in that case the law of one price holds￿ but will only di⁄er from those
obtained before in (164) ￿ (165) due to the addition of utilization costs. We notice that the weighted prices
under PCP can be re-expressed as,
b p
H;W
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ ￿Fb st; b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t + ￿Fb st;
b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t; b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t;
while it follows from equations (11) ￿ (12) that the log-linearized CPIs are,
b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH









t = ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t :
98Hence, the aggregate output equations can be re-written as follows,
b yt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pH
t ￿ ￿Fb st ￿ (￿Hb pt + ￿F b p￿
t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t + ￿x
￿










t + ￿F b pF
t
￿
￿ ￿F (b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t + ￿x
￿







t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t + ￿x
￿








t + ￿Fb st ￿ (￿F b pt + ￿Hb p￿
t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿











t + ￿Hb pF￿
t
￿
+ ￿F (b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿








t ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
+ (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿








t ￿ b pH
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿





In other words, aggregate output depends on country-weighted consumption and investment, on the rate of
utilization and also depends on the domestic terms of trade, i.e. c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pH
t
￿
. Given that in our model
terms of trade are proportional to the real exchange rate under PCP, we can easily re-write these equations
in terms of the real exchange rate as well.
We note that if we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct +￿Fb c￿
t and b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct +￿Hb c￿
t and the
relative consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). This is



























































b ut + :::
























































  b a￿
t:
(286)
99These conditions can be appropriately used to simplify the description of the in￿ ation dynamics. The terms ￿
b p
H;W







t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
can be further simpli￿ed using the implications of the law of one price
as we have done with the aggregate output equations. However, the e¢ ciency conditions are used only to
replace out the real rental rates on capital in our characterization of the Phillips curves. The simpli￿cation
under PCP does not become very useful until we have derived the Phillips curves, so we leave it for later.
The Optimal Pricing Equations. In steady state the standard pricing rule under monopolistic compe-
tition holds. Accordingly, the log-linearization of the optimal pricing equations in (79), (80), (81) and (82)
can be compactly expressed as follows,



































which are the same two pricing formulas that we obtained under PCP pricing in the model without capital
utilization. Here I must recall the assumption that the government subsidy is time-invariant and equal to
its steady state value in every period, which explains why the government subsidies do not appear in the
log-linearized pricing equations. We derive the (pre-subsidy) marginal cost equations in (20) ￿ (21), and
they can be log-linearized as,
c mct+￿ ￿   b wt+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz





t+￿ ￿   b w￿
t+￿ + (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿





while the labor market clearing conditions, which are implicit in (95) ￿ (96), can be approximated as,
b wt+￿ ￿ ￿
’















































b at+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz




















t+￿ ￿ (1 ￿  )
￿
b rz￿







where b yt+￿ and b y￿
t+￿ de￿ne domestic and foreign aggregate output. Up to this point, the derivation of
marginal costs is the same as before independently of whether the model allows for capital utilization or
not. If we combine the marginal cost equations with the output equations derived before in (251) ￿ (252),
100it follows that,

















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW





































(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿


















At this stage the equations have not been simpli￿ed to take into account the fact that the law of one price
holds in the PCP case. However, we keep that fact on the back of our minds since it will become crucial
when we simplify the Phillips Curve equations later on. The expressions now show that real marginal costs
have to account for the costs of variable capital utilization.
We can use our characterization of the real marginal costs jointly with the pricing formulas log-linearized
before to write that,













￿b ct+￿ + ’
￿
(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW































￿ Et (b ￿t+￿);
b e p
￿



















(1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿










































We log-linearize the price sub-indexes in (75) ￿ (76) and (77) ￿ (78) and re-arrange them to obtain that,
b e pt (h) ￿ b pt ￿
￿
b pH



























which is quite convenient for the purpose of aggregating the optimal pricing equations. We replace the isolated
terms 1
￿b ct and 1
￿b c￿
t out of the marginal cost. If we de￿ne the world consumption as b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t and
b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t and the relative consumption as b cR
t ￿ b ct ￿ b c￿
t, then we can write that,
b ct = b cW
t + ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW
t + ￿F￿ b rst;
b c￿
t = b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb cR
t ￿ b cW￿
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;
101where the second approximation follows from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (99). Hence,
























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW






b ut+￿ + :::


















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿












































Furthermore, these pricing equations can be expressed in the form of a system of expectational di⁄erence
equations. Let us focus on the ￿rst equation as an example. If we re-write the equation at time t + 1 and


























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW






b ut+1+￿ + :::
























￿ Et (b ￿t+1+￿):
Hence, using the computation of the conditional expectation, the pricing equation can easily be decomposed
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b ut + :::




























t+1 ￿ b pt+1
￿i
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￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW






b ut + :::



















We can apply the same approach (and algebraic steps) to re-write the other pricing equation as an expecta-






















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b cW￿









































































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿




























These equations provide a very simple characterization of the price dynamics at the price sub-index level.
By the law of one price, the price sub-index for imports in each country is entirely determined by the
nominal exchange rate and the price sub-index of the same bundle of goods in its local market. Naturally,
the dynamics of the relative price sub-indexes b ￿
H;R
t ￿ b ￿
H




t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ) and b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F





t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t ) can be determined as follows,
b ￿
H;R
t ￿ b ￿
H
t ￿ b ￿
H￿
t ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1 = (b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t) + b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (287)
b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t ￿ b st = (b pt ￿ b p￿
t) + b rst; (288)
b ￿
F;R
t ￿ b ￿
F
t ￿ b ￿
F￿
t ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1 = (b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t) + b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (289)
b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t ￿ b st = (b pt ￿ b p￿
t) + b rst; (290)
where b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t and b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t are the relative CPI and the relative CPI in￿ ation, respectively.




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b ut + :::














































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿





































We have de￿ned the world weighted price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t +￿Hb pF￿
t ,
and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we can write
that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :




















￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
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b ut + :::
￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’



















































￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)’
￿
b cW￿








￿F b rst ￿
￿
1+(1￿ )’

































By appropriately replacing the e¢ ciency conditions in (285) ￿ (286), and after a little bit of algebra, we




























































b ut + :::






















t ￿ b pR
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t ￿ b pR
t
￿

























Furthermore, given that under PCP the law of one price holds at the variety level, then it must be the case
that b pH
t ￿ b st + b pH￿
t and b pF
t ￿ b st + b pF￿





t ￿ (b st ￿ b st￿1)
￿




t+1 ￿ (b st+1 ￿ b st)
￿





















































b ut + :::






















t ￿ b pR
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t + (b st ￿ b st￿1)
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t+1 + (b st+1 ￿ b st)
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b ut + :::






















t ￿ b pR
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t ￿ b pR
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￿

























We de￿ne the log-linearized CPI indexes of both countries as b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t +￿Hb pF￿
t .
In turn, it follows that CPI in￿ ation can be calculated as b ￿t ￿ ￿Hb ￿
H
t + ￿Fb ￿
F
t and b ￿
￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ￿
H￿
t + ￿Hb ￿
F￿
t .
Therefore, it is easy to derive the dynamics of b ￿t ￿ b pt ￿ b pt￿1 and b ￿
￿
t ￿ b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1 from the equations above.
For domestic in￿ ation, b ￿t, it follows that,
























































￿Hb ut + :::
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106and, after further re-arranging, we get that,


























































[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿






































t ￿ b pR
t
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b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h




































































[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿






































t ￿ b pR
t
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where world weighted capital is de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t. For foreign in￿ ation, b ￿
￿




























































￿Fb ut + :::
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￿Fb ut + :::
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] + :::





































t ￿ b pR
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::






































t ￿ b pR
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108where world weighted capital is de￿ned as b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t.
In summary, it follows that the domestic and foreign Phillips curves can be expressed as,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿






































t ￿ b pR
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where the world weighted capital measures are de￿ned as b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt +￿Fb k￿
t and b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt +￿Hb k￿
t. We



































































































































































































































Based on our de￿nitions of the world weighted price indexes and sub-indexes, denoted with the superscripts

















































































since b pt = ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t = ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿
t . Furthermore, we also know based on those same
































































































































































































These derivations are true irrespective of whether the law of one price holds or not. Finally, we conclude
110that both Phillips curves in the model take the following form,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿











































b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h






















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::


































which extends the model under PCP pricing by adding capital, investment, and variable capital utilization
rates. Let us de￿ne b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t as the world measure of terms of trade in the model. Then, the
111in￿ ation dynamics can be re-expressed as,
b ￿t ￿ ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿F
h
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[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::

































































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::


































t ￿ b st ￿ 0; b p
F;R
t ￿ b st ￿ 0;
so the Phillips curves can be further simpli￿ed as,
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
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[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::































where we denote the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the nominal exchange rate as ￿b st ￿ b st ￿b st￿1. Alternatively, we note
112that these Phillips curves can be re-arranged as follows,
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[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::
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￿￿￿
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’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::































which means that the Phillips curve in each country can be written as the exact same present discounted
value as for the LCP pricing model (with variable capital utilization) except for the addition of an extra
term that captures the full pass-through of nominal exchange rate movements into import prices. That is,
under LCP pricing current domestic and foreign in￿ ation can be expressed as,
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113while under PCP pricing current domestic and foreign in￿ ation become,
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These expressions re￿ ect the role played by the LCP and PCP assumptions on the trade-o⁄between nominal
and real variables captured by the Phillips curves.





t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
as the world measure of terms
of trade in this model. As in the model under PCP without capital utilization in (176), the only constraint
































matters because it a⁄ects aggregate output and because aggregate output enters into the Taylor feedback
rule for monetary policy. Therefore, in this case with no home-product bias it must follow from (295) that ￿
b p
H;R







t ￿ b pR
t
￿






t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
, and we need to keep track of the price sub-indexes in some other way in order to
close down the model.









because it a⁄ects aggregate output in both countries and it also matters because it a⁄ects the real marginal
costs of ￿rms. Moreover, we can write the world terms of trade as follows,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿


















This equality is crucial to derive the dynamics of world terms of trade. We have shown that under PCP it
114must be the case that b p
F;R
t ￿ b p
H;R
t ￿ b st, so it follows that,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿































which is an equation that clearly ties the world terms of trade to the real exchange rate (an endogenous
variable already accounted for in the model). This is the same relationship as in (177) without variable
capital utilization. This relationship coupled with the de￿nition of the real exchange rate, i.e.
￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿
t ￿ b ￿t; (297)
￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; (298)
￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; (299)
su¢ ces to close the model in the PCP case.
Given that b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t +￿Hb pF￿
t , b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt +￿Hb p￿
t, b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t +￿Hb pF￿
t ,
the de￿nition of world terms of trade, b tW
t , can be expressed as,
b tW
t ￿ b p
F;W￿
t ￿ b pW￿
t = ￿F b pF
t + ￿Hb pF￿
















t ￿ ￿Hb pH






t ￿ ￿F b pH￿





(1 ￿ ￿F) b pF





(1 ￿ ￿H) b pF￿
















Then, using the implication that the law of one price holds under PCP pricing, i.e. b pH
t ￿ b st + b pH￿
t and
b pF
t ￿ b st + b pF￿





































If we put this expression together with the expression that we just derived linking the world terms of trade
to the real exchange rate, then it immediately follows that,
2￿H￿F
￿H ￿ ￿F









b rst = (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
b pF








t ￿ b pH
t
￿
, in the absence of deviations from the law of one price. Furthermore, if there is no
home-product bias, i.e. ￿H = ￿F, then the real exchange rate would be invariant over time.
5.4.4 Other Relationships
On Aggregate Output and the E¢ ciency Conditions. Using the de￿nition of world terms of trade
we can write aggregate output from equations (251) ￿ (252) as,
b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t + ￿x
￿





t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t + ￿x
￿





Using the e¢ ciency conditions in (253)￿(254) and, after a little bit of algebra, it follows that the real rental




















b ut + ￿F b rst + ￿
1+’





























t ￿ ￿F b rst ￿ ￿
1+’









  b a￿
t:
Here, we simply re-write the previous equations replacing out the relative prices with the de￿nition of world
terms of trade. However, for the purpose of deriving the Phillips curves of the model su¢ ces to use the
expressions obtained in (251) ￿ (252) and (253) ￿ (254), replacing the relative prices with world terms of
trade afterward. To posit the model, however, we need to add (302) ￿ (303) in place of (251) ￿ (252).
These expressions do not depend on whether LCP pricing or PCP pricing are assumed. However, with
PCP pricing the law of one price holds and we can tie the world terms of trade to the real exchange rate as
noted before.
On Aggregate Employment. The aggregate employment can be easily derived from the production
functions in (91) and (92) as,
b yt ￿ b at + (1 ￿  )b kt +  b lt;
b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t + (1 ￿  )b k￿
t +  b l￿
t:
These are the same equations that we obtained in the model without capital utilization. However, b kt denotes
now capital services rather than physical capital as before.
On Real Exports, Real Imports, and the Net Exports Share. In a two-country model, su¢ ces to
determine the net exports share of the domestic country, b tbt. The net exports share can be easily computed
as the di⁄erence between domestic aggregate output and domestic aggregate consumption, investment and
116capital utilization costs in real terms (the domestic absorption) (see, e.g., Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005), i.e.
b tbt ￿ b yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct ￿ ￿xb xt ￿ ￿x
￿




Using the formula derived above for aggregate output, we obtain the following expression,
b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)[(￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t) ￿ b ct] + ￿x [(￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t) ￿ b xt]
= ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F [b ct ￿ b c￿
t] ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t ;
where b cW
t ￿ ￿Hb ct+￿Fb c￿
t, b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt+￿Fb x￿
t, and b xR
t ￿ b xt￿b x￿
t. Using the perfect international risk-sharing
condition in (99), we can express the net exports share as,
b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F￿ b rst ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t :
In other words, the trade balance is not directly a⁄ected by capital utilization costs because aggregate capital
cannot be traded across countries (only varieties are tradable). In this environment, therefore, the capital
utilization term appears on the domestic aggregate output demand and it also appears on the domestic
absorption, so it cancels out. The trade balance can be simpli￿ed for the PCP case by recalling that world
terms of trade are tied to the real exchange rate whenever the law of one price holds.
The real exports and imports of domestic goods in the model can be inferred from equations (49)￿(52)





t (h) + X￿





































H = ￿F under our assumption of home-product bias in consumption and investment. A simple
log-linearization of both de￿nitions allows us to obtain the following pair of equations,










t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿Z 1
0






t ￿ b pt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
The log-linearization of the price sub-indexes in (13) ￿ (14) clearly implies that
R 1
0 b p￿
t (h)dh ￿ b pH￿
t and
R 1
0 b pt (f)dh ￿ b pF
t . Therefore, the ￿rst-order e⁄ects of relative price dispersion at the variety level are
negligible for real exports and real imports (as they are for aggregate output), and we can re-write the
equations above simply as,
d expt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pH￿
t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;
d impt ￿ ￿￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b pt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt:
We have de￿ned the world weighted price sub-indexes as b p
H;W
t ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pH￿
t and b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b pF
t +
117￿Hb pF￿
t , and the relative price sub-indexes as b p
H;R
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH￿
t and b p
F;R
t ￿ b pF
t ￿ b pF￿
t . Then, naturally, we
can write that,
b pH
t = b p
H;W
t + ￿F b p
H;R
t ; b pH￿
t = b p
H;W




t = b p
F;W￿
t + ￿Hb p
F;R
t ; b pF￿
t = b p
F;W￿
t ￿ ￿F b p
F;R
t :
Analogously, we have de￿ned the world CPI as b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pt+￿F b p￿
t and b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pt+￿Hb p￿
t, and the relative
CPI as b pR
t ￿ b pt ￿ b p￿
t. Then, we can write that,
b pt = b pW
t + ￿F b pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW
t ￿ ￿Hb pR
t ;
b pt = b pW￿
t + ￿Hb pR
t ; b p￿
t = b pW￿
t ￿ ￿F b pR
t :
Using these de￿nitions, it is possible to express the relative prices embedded in the real export and real
import equations in the following terms, i.e.
b pH￿



























t ￿ b pt = b p
F;W￿
























t ￿ b pW￿
t
￿
. The de￿nition of CPI in both countries,
i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t + ￿F b pF
t and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t + ￿Hb pF￿




















































































Using the second equality derived above and the de￿nition of the world terms of trade, we can write the
relative prices embedded in the de￿nition of real exports and imports in the following terms, i.e.
b pH￿























































































t ￿ b pR
t
￿i
= ￿(￿H + ￿F)b tW
t = ￿b tW
t :









t ￿ b p￿
t
￿
+ ￿F [(1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿




t ￿ b pt
￿










t ￿ b pt
￿￿
+ ￿F [(1 ￿ ￿x)(b c￿
t ￿ b ct) + ￿x (b x￿
t ￿ b xt)]
= ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F [b ct ￿ b c￿
t] ￿ ￿x￿Fb xR
t ￿ b tbt;
where relative investment is b xR
t ￿ b xt ￿ b x￿
t. In other words, our measure of the trade balance is equivalent
to the di⁄erence between the log of real exports and real imports (in deviations relative to their respective
steady states), scaled by the parameter ￿F. In the deterministic steady state of our model, it follows easily
that the parameter ￿F denotes the share of domestic imports (and foreign exports) for consumption and
investment purposes relative to aggregate output.
Real exports and real imports can be re-written in the following form,








t ￿ b pR
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (304)





t ￿ b pR
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt; (305)
or, simply,









t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (306)









t ￿ b pR
t
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (307)




t ￿ b pR
t
￿
to the world terms of trade b tW
t ￿ in order
to express the real imports and real exports more compactly as follows,









t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (308)









t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (309)
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t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (310)






t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (311)
These two equations tell us that the strength of the demand for consumption and investment purposes is
likely to have a major impact on both exports and imports. However, they also tell us that exports and
imports depend on world terms of trade, b tW
t , which is the sole variable that summarizes the impact of
international relative prices on both real exports and real imports in the context of our model.
Let us de￿ne domestic terms of trade as c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t
￿
in a model under LCP pricing, where





t , the real exchange rate, b rst = b st+b p￿
t ￿b pt, and the CPI for both countries, i.e. b pt ￿ ￿Hb pH
t +￿F b pF
t
and b p￿
t ￿ ￿F b pH￿
t +￿Hb pF￿
t , we can easily see that world terms of trade, b tW
t , are a simple linear function of the
domestic terms of trade, c tott ￿
￿
b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t
￿





c tott + b rst
￿
: (312)
The advantage of this transformation is that the world terms of trade can be expressed as a linear function
of domestic terms of trade and the real exchange, which are both measurable in the data (unlike world terms
of trade itself). This expression is exactly the same one that we found in (191) in a model without variable
capital utilization.
We have shown that under PCP it must be the case that b p
F;R
t ￿ b p
H;R




t ￿ b pR
t
￿
￿ b st + b p￿
t ￿ b pt = b rst:











t ￿ b pR
t
￿
with a linear transfor-
mation of the real exchange rate as we have done before. We, then, obtain the following expressions for the
120real exports and real imports under PCP,






b rst ￿ b rst
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿







b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿







b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t; (313)






b rst + b rst
￿












b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt: (314)
These equations are the same ones that we derived in (192)￿(193) under PCP, but without variable capital
utilization. Contrary to what happens with the LCP model, we do not need to add a third equation to close
the model because all international relative prices that a⁄ect the path of real imports and real exports are
summarized by the real exchange rate which is already one of the endogenous variables of the model.
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A The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions with LCP: A Summary
Here, we report the system of equations derived after log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions of the model
with LCP.
A.1 The Model Without Capital
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
The Firms￿Problem:
AS










t + ￿Fb cW￿
t
￿
+ 2￿H￿F b rst + (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿’b tW
t ￿























t + ￿Hb cW￿
t
￿
￿ 2￿F￿H b rst ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿’b tW
t ￿
































Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + b cW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + b cW￿
t ;
L b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at;
L￿ b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t;
￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:
123A.2 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - NAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿b vt;
Q￿ b q￿























t ￿ ￿b v￿
t;
KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
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￿Hb cW
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￿Hb xW
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  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
124A.3 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - CAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿



































KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿





















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
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￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW
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￿Fb xW























































































  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
125A.4 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - IAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et [b ￿t+1]
￿i
;
b xt ￿ 1
1+￿b xt￿1 +
￿
1+￿Et [b xt+1] + 1
￿(1+￿) (b qt + b vt);
Q￿ b q￿


































t + b v￿
t);
KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿





















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW






















































































  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











126A.5 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - NAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿b vt;
Q￿ b q￿










































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::




















































































  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











127A.6 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - CAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿




































































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::




















































































  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
128A.7 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - IAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et [b ￿t+1]
￿i
;
b xt ￿ 1
1+￿b xt￿1 +
￿
1+￿Et [b xt+1] + 1
￿(1+￿) (b qt + b vt);
Q￿ b q￿





















































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::




















































































  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; b ￿
R
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t; ￿b tW
t ￿ b tW
t ￿ b tW
t￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











129A.8 Net Exports, Real Exports and Real Imports
The Model Without Capital:
NX b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;






t + b c￿
t;






t + b ct;
The Model With Capital (NAC, CAC, IAC), With or Without Capital Utilization:
NX b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F￿ b rst ￿ ￿x￿F (b xt ￿ b x￿
t);






t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;






t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt;
Other Coe¢ cients:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
130B The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions with PCP: A Summary
Here, we report the system of equations derived after log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions of the model
with PCP.
B.1 The Model Without Capital
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
The Firms￿Problem:
AS









t + ￿Fb cW￿
t
￿
+ 2￿H￿F b rst + (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿’b tW
t ￿ :::






















t + ￿Hb cW￿
t
￿
￿ 2￿F￿H b rst ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿F)￿’b tW
t ￿ :::







￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿
t ￿ b ￿t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + b cW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + b cW￿
t ;
L b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at;
L￿ b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t;
￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:
131B.2 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - NAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿b vt;
Q￿ b q￿























t ￿ ￿b v￿
t;
KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿





















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW



























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW




































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











132B.3 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - CAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿



































KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿





















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW



























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW




































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











133B.4 The Model With Capital, Without Capital Utilization - IAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et [b ￿t+1]
￿i
;
b xt ￿ 1
1+￿b xt￿1 +
￿
1+￿Et [b xt+1] + 1
￿(1+￿) (b qt + b vt);
Q￿ b q￿


































t + b v￿
t);
KA b kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt);
KA￿ b k￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b k￿
t + ￿ (b x￿





















’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW



































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW
t + ￿xb xW
t ;
Y￿ b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿
t + ￿xb xW￿
t ;
L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
134B.5 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - NAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿b vt;
Q￿ b q￿










































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::

































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











135B.6 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - CAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ ￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et (b ￿t+1)
￿i
;
b qt ￿ ￿￿
￿




































































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::

































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











136B.7 The Model With Capital, With Capital Utilization - IAC
The Households￿Problem:
IS b ct ￿ Et [b ct+1] ￿ ￿
￿



















RS b ct ￿ b c￿
t ￿ ￿ b rst;
Q
b qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [b qt+1] +
h







b it ￿ Et [b ￿t+1]
￿i
;
b xt ￿ 1
1+￿b xt￿1 +
￿
1+￿Et [b xt+1] + 1
￿(1+￿) (b qt + b vt);
Q￿ b q￿





















































KA b e kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e kt + ￿ (b xt + b vt); b kt ￿ b ut + b e kt;
KA￿ b e k
￿
t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b e k
￿
t + ￿ (b x￿
t + b v￿
t); b k￿
t ￿ b u￿
























’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Hb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Hb xW














[￿Hb ut + ￿Fb u￿
t] + :::


























































’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿￿
￿Fb cW









’ +(1￿ ) ’2
￿￿
￿Fb xW














[￿Fb ut + ￿Hb u￿
t] ￿ :::

































￿H￿￿F b rst; ￿b rst = ￿b st + b ￿
￿



























  b a￿
t;
Aggregate Output and Employment:
Y b yt ￿ ￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW








t ￿ ￿￿b tW
t + (1 ￿ ￿x)b cW￿








L  b lt ￿ b yt ￿ b at ￿ (1 ￿  )b kt;
L￿  b l￿
t ￿ b y￿
t ￿ b a￿
t ￿ (1 ￿  )b k￿
t;
The Monetary Policy:
MP b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿




t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 yb y￿








t ￿ ￿Hb ct + ￿Fb c￿
t; b cW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb ct + ￿Hb c￿
t; b xW
t ￿ ￿Hb xt + ￿Fb x￿
t; b xW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb xt + ￿Hb x￿
t;
b kW
t ￿ ￿Hb kt + ￿Fb k￿
t; b kW￿
t ￿ ￿Fb kt + ￿Hb k￿
t; ￿b rst ￿ b rst ￿ b rst￿1; ￿b st ￿ b st ￿ b st￿1; b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1; b ￿
￿
t = b p￿
t ￿ b p￿
t￿1:











137B.8 Net Exports, Real Exports and Real Imports
The Model Without Capital:
NX b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ ￿F￿ b rst;





b rst + b c￿
t;





b rst + b ct;
The Model With Capital (NAC, CAC, IAC), With or Without Capital Utilization:
NX b tbt ￿ ￿b tW
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)￿F￿ b rst ￿ ￿x￿F (b xt ￿ b x￿
t);





b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b c￿
t + ￿xb x￿
t;





b rst + (1 ￿ ￿x)b ct + ￿xb xt;
Other Coe¢ cients:






￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿1
:
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